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1. 
Background and Objectives of the Review
The Federal Republic of Germany is the third largest bilateral 
donor of development aid in Afghanistan following the USA and 
Japan. Up through 2014 federal funds for German development 
cooperation (GDC) have amounted to over 2 billion euros, of 
which 1.575 billion euros have been allocated through the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 
Afghanistan is the main receiving country of bilateral funds 
allocated through the BMZ. The unique position of this partner 
country demands continual observation of the effectiveness of 
the allocations provided, which implicitly suggests reviewing 
whether and how effectiveness has actually been observed. The 
Advisory Board of the German Institute for Development Evalu-
ation (DEval) has requested the Institute to provide a review of 
the types, scope, quality, and usefulness of all evaluations of GDC 
conducted under the aegis of the BMZ. Using this information, 
the review should also present recommendations for designing 
an evaluation program which can support further shaping of the 
BMZ-country-portfolio in Afghanistan based on robust evidence. 
Therefore, this study is not an evaluation of GDC interventions in 
Afghanistan on its own, but is rather characterized as a review of 
the evaluations which have already been conducted on projects 
and programs funded by BMZ.
2.
Portfolio of GDC in Afghanistan
Parallel to the deployment of the ISAF-Mission, the Federal 
Republic of Germany strengthened its engagement in devel-
opment cooperation in Afghanistan. With its supporting funds 
amounting to 80 million euros, Germany was already the largest 
European donor country in 2002. Up through 2010, funding 
commitments for development cooperation in Afghanistan have 
continually increased to an amount of 430 million euros annually 
(with BMZ proportionally directing funds up to 250 million euros 
and the Federal Foreign Office (AA) up to 180 million euros). 
Further German ministries (BMVg, BMI, BMEL) and German 
federal states are also actively involved in providing funds toward 
rebuilding Afghanistan, although to a much lesser degree. Under 
the condition that the Afghan government continues to imple-
ment its plans for reform, this level of development financing 
should remain unchanged up through 2016. Further engagement 
up to at least 2024 has already been held in prospect. 
The priorities of GDC in Afghanistan have shifted over time: 
although one-fourth of the BMZ portfolio originally focused on 
emergency aid, this focus has moved toward more long-term 
development objectives and durations of projects. BMZ relies 
mainly on the German Agency for International Cooperation 
(GIZ) and the German Development Bank (KfW), as well as a 
number of non-governmental organisations (NGO) for project 
implementation. 
Since 2002 KfW has financed a total 56 projects and programs 
in Afghanistan on behalf of BMZ and the AA with a sum of more 
than one billion euros. The funds received from BMZ amounted 
to 80 % of the full sum and financed 38 of the 56 projects and 
programs. The volume of the entire project portfolio of KfW 
in Afghanistan jumped from around 106 million euros in 2009 
to nearly 247 million euros in 2010. However, the volume sank 
again to just 152 million euros in 2012. The largest percentage of 
funding between 2007 and 2012 was granted to the area of gov-
ernance, followed by sustainable economic development, education, 
and water and sanitation. The assistance provided by KfW in the 
area of governance is focused on support to public administration 
in the implementation of development projects in rural areas.
GIZ has implemented a total of 83 projects and programs since 
2002, 60 of which are still running. As in the case of KfW, a large 
proportion of the GIZ-funds were received from BMZ. The total 
sum of funds received by GIZ between 2002 and 2013 is at about 
400 million euros, funding 57 % of GIZ-projects. The remaining 
amount of GIZ-funds was received mainly from the AA. GIZ 
implemented projects and programs in the following sectors and 
areas of intervention: energy, sustainable economic development, 
water and sanitation, education, emergency and transitional aid, 
health, good governance, and civil peace service.
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3.
Questions and focus of the review
This review will address questions regarding (a) the type and 
scope of the evaluations available, (b) the quality of the eval-
uations according to OECD / DAC-standards, (c) the usage of 
the evaluation results, as well as (d) the future direction of an 
evaluation program.
It is important to mention, that in this review these questions 
can only be answered in terms of the evaluations related to the 
BMZ portfolio in Afghanistan. These presently account for 53 % 
of the entire civilian engagement of Germany in Afghanistan. 
Currently DEval is not yet mandated to conduct evaluations 
with other federal ministries (AA, BMVg, BMI, BMEL), which are 
also involved in the process of rebuilding Afghanistan. However, 
information provided by the implementing agencies on the AA 
portfolio could still be considered, which helped gain further 
insights on the coordination of German actors in their develop-
ment work and evaluation activities.
4.
Method of the review 
Document analyses, interviews with staff from BMZ, GIZ and 
KfW, as well as interviews with external research experts were 
conducted for this review. Methodologically the review was 
completed in three steps: 
According to guidelines for bilateral cooperation, the imple-
menting agencies of the BMZ – GIZ and KfW – are required to 
conduct evaluations of their projects and programs on a regular 
basis. Therefore, in a first step of this review, requests were made 
directly to GIZ and KfW to provide all evaluations at the project 
level. Of the 127 documents provided, 38 reports were classified 
as an evaluation or as evaluative work. From these a sample of 
11 reports was drawn to be reviewed for their quality based on 
a specific framework of analysis. This analytical framework con-
sidered the purpose and relevance of these evaluations, as well 
as the evaluation questions and focus, the applied methods, and 
the quality and robustness of the evaluation results. The moni-
toring system of GDC was also critically addressed. The existing 
comprehensive tracking system of all projects in Afghanistan 
funded with German funds is a category in itself.
In a second step, evaluative works of particular strategic sig-
nificance were collected and analyzed more closely. Up to now, 
German involvement in Afghanistan has not been subject to any 
extensive and independent evaluation, which has considered 
all projects under the lead of BMZ and its project implementing 
agencies. The closest to this is an impact assessment in Northern 
Afghanistan, conducted every two years since 2007 by a special 
research team at the Freie Universität Berlin with the support 
of BMZ, and a strategic portfolio review, commissioned by BMZ 
in 2012 to a research group under the same head as for the 
impact analysis (Zürcher et al. 2013). These pieces of evaluative 
work were analyzed to show whether conclusions can be drawn 
in terms of the effectiveness of the BMZ portfolio, as well as 
whether strategic decision-making processes could be supported 
with robust evidence.
In a third analytical step, the recommendations drawn from the 
evaluation reports were reviewed. Twenty-five expert informant 
interviews were conducted to verify and determine whether and 
how these recommendations were used within BMZ and the 
implementing agencies for their ongoing program planning and 
strategic decision-making.
5.
Main conclusions and recommendations
The DEval-review indicates that the available evaluation reports 
at the project level are of relatively good quality and that the 
results are used by the actors of GDC. However, these evalua-
tions concentrate on capturing and assessing outputs and hardly 
consider any effects of the interventions at outcome- and impact 
levels. The number of studies focusing on socio-economic effects 
is limited, with the exception of the two evaluative works com-
missioned by BMZ as mentioned above. The impact assessment 
from Zürcher et al. (2007a, 2010) is the most comprehensive 
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analysis of the effects of development cooperation among the 
population in areas where GDC is largely active. This study 
observes and records the development of the economic and 
social situation, as well as the perceptions of the population with 
regard to foreign armed forces, development aid, security, and 
state legitimacy. With this, the research team has proven that 
conducting methodologically sophisticated impact analyses of 
development aid including extensive household surveys is also 
possible in Afghanistan. Together with the subsequent strategic 
portfolio review it is quite possible that these analyses, beyond 
the sole areas of interest of BMZ, can provide examples for the 
generation of strategic evidence not only in Afghanistan, but 
also in other fragile states. Up to now, there have not been any 
further strategic evaluations (sector, instrument, or portfolio 
evaluations), nor centralized GDC-program evaluations focused 
on socio-economic effects for assessing German involvement in 
Afghanistan. Thus, Germany lags behind the evaluation efforts 
of most other bi- and multi-lateral donors. Most of these have 
already commissioned external and internal evaluators to assess 
the effectiveness of their country programs.
Therefore, the informational value of the available project evalua-
tions remains limited in terms of the strategic planning, deci-
sion-making, and management of the portfolio. Without the im-
pact assessment and the additional portfolio review there would 
hardly be any analyses, which could provide decision-makers with 
points of reference for strategic decisions. Thus, for example, 
little can be said about whether the selection of the five BMZ- 
sector priorities and the projects within these sectors is effective, 
whether in certain circumstances they will be sustainable in the 
future, whether setting up trust funds as a financial instrument is 
successful, or whether the selected gender strategy is effective. 
Conclusions can hardly be made to what extent the overarching 
objectives of the GDC in Afghanistan have been achieved.
The reasons for the limited scope and reduced ambitions of most 
of the evaluations lie paradoxically within the context of the 
high attention drawn by the German public to the involvement 
of Germany in Afghanistan. In addition to the security situation 
within the country, the five German federal ministries active 
in Afghanistan follow different objectives, approaches, and 
operational procedures. According to actors in the field, the 
high attention to German involvement in Afghanistan set them 
under pressure to continually show progress and report quick 
successes. In order to meet constant informational demands of 
the German media, the parliament, and the government, as well 
as due to the undeniable difficulty in generating solid data on 
economic and social effects in fragile circumstances, the moni-
toring and evaluation system (M&E) was focused even more on 
the measurement of completed tasks (outputs) than is otherwise 
usual in the field of international development cooperation. Thus, 
one of the functions of evaluation is still more emphasized, than 
in the work in other partner countries: evaluation results serve 
more on proving accountability with regard to the contributions 
made and less on drawing insights which encourage critical 
learning and support portfolio management. 
An example of this can be shown by the work of the M&E-Unit 
in Kabul. With its so-called tracking system this unit analyzes all 
civilian activities of German federal ministries in Afghanistan 
at the output-level. A collection and assessment of data at the 
sector- or country-level or at a higher level of effectiveness does 
not occur. Indeed, up to now there has been a lack of clearly set 
standards to ensure the consistent formulation of objectives 
and indicators at the country- and sector-levels, even though 
there are three BMZ-sector priority strategy papers available for 
reference. However, the new country strategy of BMZ addresses 
these weaknesses.
BMZ has attempted twice to obtain agreement from all active 
federal ministries to an evaluation of the whole of German civil-
ian engagement in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these attempts 
have not been successful.
Recommendations:
In order to show how evaluations can provide a better informa-
tional basis for supporting decision-makers in their strategic 
management of the portfolio, as well as staff of GDC in the 
implementation of their projects and programs, the following 
recommendations of action have been drawn from this review:
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 • Overcome the fragmentation of the current M&E system by 
incorporating an integrative evaluation approach. 
 • Adjust the M&E system beyond the performance-(output-)
level toward a stronger focus on acquiring data on effects 
(outcomes and impacts) of project interventions and sector 
strategies. 
 • Draw objectives and indicators at the program and pro-
ject-levels to include those at the country- to the sector-levels. 
This will now be substantially easier given that objectives and 
indicators are addressed in the new BMZ country strategy. 
 • Establish a more systematic collection of baseline data at the 
project- and sector level as a basis for robust impact analyses. 
 • Increase standardized data collection in order to enable the 
comparison between different levels / units. 
 • Establish centralized quality control to ensure that the 
decentralized implemented evaluations are more aligned with 
an overarching strategy of the GDC in terms of focus and data 
collection. 
 • Expand the mandate of the M&E unit in Kabul in order to or-
ganizationally support an integrated approach to evaluation. 
This should include overseeing the implementation of M&E at 
the project level and collecting additional monitoring data at 
the sector and country level. 
 • Expand the tasks and scope of the tracking system to assist 
the M&E unit in Kabul in collecting the appropriate data 
mentioned. 
 • Strengthen the focus on conflict sensitive and peace building 
measures (which is already considered a strength of the 
German approach) by systematically including an assessment 
of these measures as a test criterion. 
 • Institutionalize the sharing of information on evaluation 
results among the staff of the country program in Germany 
and Afghanistan, as well as with Afghan partners.
 • Altogether, develop an evaluation culture, which not only 
points to successes, but also to failures in order to encourage 
institutional learning and enable corresponding adjustments 
in communication strategies.
For the completion of the internal M&E system it is also recom-
mended to conduct external and independent evaluations.
Given the major significance of the partner country in GDC, the 
level of accountability required of implemented projects and pro-
grams, the expected gains in knowledge about taking action in 
fragile states, and the desire to engage in discussions with other 
international donors based on robust evidence, it remains worth 
striving for an evaluation of all ODA-interventions of Germany in 
Afghanistan. However, conducting this kind of country evalua-
tion as an impact evaluation is currently not possible uncondi-
tionally. Due to the gaps in the measurement of impact at the 
project level, this kind of evaluation will be required to focus on 
assessing objective-oriented systems and intervention logics, on 
comparative analyses of the effectiveness of various instruments 
and approaches, on the inter-sectoral sequencing of various 
interventions, and on exemplary data collection in the field on 
the effects of particularly relevant and critical interventions. Nev-
ertheless, even these analyses can provide valuable information 
in terms of improving the cooperation between German federal 
ministries and with Afghan partners, particularly in relation to 
their objectives, strategies, and operational approaches.
Should the decision to conduct this sort of comprehensive strate-
gic evaluation of the entire GDC in Afghanistan continue to not 
be feasible politically, the German government should give solid 
reasons for this. These reasons will have to go beyond the known 
methodological limitations or specifically hindering contexts 
of the country, given the positive experience in conducting the 
strategic evaluative work commissioned by BMZ. In DEval’s judg-
ment, a country evaluation solely focused on the BMZ portfolio 
is also not an alternative to an overall country portfolio evalua-
tion across the ministries. It cannot be expected that a country 
evaluation of the BMZ portfolio in Afghanistan will provide 
findings at the level of the entire program for at least a few years 
– perhaps not until about halfway through the implementation of 
the BMZ country strategy 2014-17. Only then can one expect to 
draw insights which go substantially beyond the impact assess-
ment and the strategic portfolio review already commissioned 
by BMZ. Alternatively, conducting sector evaluations within the 
framework of the BMZ portfolio could and should be considered. 
The achievement of objectives in one of the five sector priorities 
could first be assessed and then validated through particularly 
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selected surveys or interviews in the field. The assessment could 
then be spread to other sectors or to other areas beyond BMZ 
responsibility. The results of these evaluations would gradually 
establish better comparability between the sectors and thereby 
provide valuable information for steering the entire portfolio of 
development cooperation.
Should meeting the demands for conducting an overarching 
impact analysis in Afghanistan be further limited, it could still be 
possible to conduct some meta-analyses despite the generally 
weak measurement of effects at the project level. These could fo-
cus on specific research questions (regarding certain experiences 
within a sector, observations of approaches or instruments, etc.) 
in order to increase the value of project evaluations and reports 
already conducted. The objective of the meta-analyses would 
be to compile existing knowledge on a certain topic, in order 
to determine overarching valid findings and issues beyond the 
project level.
Two themes stand out as appropriate for meta-analyses, par-
ticularly for impact-oriented evaluations. The first could address 
the development of political and administrative or technical 
capacities (capacity development; CD) since these kinds of in-
terventions represent 40 % of the BMZ portfolio in Afghanistan. 
The international exchange on the available evaluations of other 
donors and their experiences has attested to very little sustaina-
ble effects of these kinds of programs. The BMZ portfolio review 
has also pointed to low interest and a small demand for CD from 
Afghan political elites. A second theme, gender equity, has been 
a continual focus of development cooperation programs and 
receives much attention politically. The analyzed sources have 
revealed that there is still little understanding about the effec-
tiveness of projects focusing on gender or of overarching gender 
mainstreaming. Thus, this issue would also be appropriate for a 
thematic evaluation.
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.  |  Introduction 2
T
he entire volume of German development assistance 
in Afghanistan has been considerable, with over two 
billion euros spent since 2002. As the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and its 
allies prepare for an end of the International Security Assistance 
Forces (ISAF) mandate and the return of the country’s full 
national sovereignty in 2014, discussions about a future strategy 
for German development assistance in Afghanistan are well un-
derway. Germany’s commitment to remain active in development 
cooperation in Afghanistan through 2024 has raised interest 
about how Germany’s development engagement over the past 10 
years has been evaluated. This review has been undertaken at the 
request of members of the DEval Advisory Board. It particularly 
addresses the question whether efforts by the German Govern-
ment in Afghanistan have been sufficiently evaluated enough 
to underpin the strategy for German development cooperation 
(GDC) in Afghanistan based on evidence and lessons learned.1
This review examines what kinds of evaluative works have been 
conducted on GDC efforts in Afghanistan under the aegis of the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ), the perceived quality of these works, and how results 
have been used for planning and decision-making. This report 
does not review the evaluations of Germany’s development 
assistance in Afghanistan over all, but is confined to the BMZ 
portfolio implemented by governmental agencies. The BMZ 
portfolio currently accounts for roughly 53 % of the total volume 
of GDC. Indeed, the Federal Foreign Office (AA), the Federal 
Ministry of Defense (BMVg), the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
(BMI), and the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL) 
are also working in Afghanistan.2 The reason why this review 
does not consider German development assistance as a whole, 
lies in the fact that the mandate of DEval is currently limited to 
the evaluation of projects and programs of BMZ and not of other 
German ministries. Therefore, interviews have not been carried 
out with representatives of these other German ministries in 
the context of the study. However, for reasons of comparison, as 
well as for discussing the issue of coordination among German 
actors in Afghanistan, information provided by the implementing 
agencies (GIZ and KfW) on the AA portfolio in Afghanistan has 
been used for this report. In doing so, it needs to be explicitly 
mentioned that there has been no direct communication with 
AA staff on any aspect of this report, nor have any of the findings 
been verified by the AA.
Keeping this limitation in mind, this report addresses questions 
regarding (a) the type and scope of the evaluations, (b) the 
quality of the evaluations in terms of OECD / DAC-Standards, (c) 
the usage of the evaluation results, and (d) the future direction 
of an evaluation program. Seven questions have been formulated 
more specifically for the analytical framework of this review.3 
Along with reviewing past evaluation practices, a second purpose 
of this review is to identify specific information gaps and to 
provide recommendations for future evaluations. 
The report presents its findings in three parts. The first part pro-
vides an overview of the GDC portfolio in Afghanistan since 2002 
in order to place the assessment in the right context (Chapter 
2). The second part presents an overview of the evaluative work 
that has been conducted, and assesses its quality and to some 
extent its utilization (Chapter 3). The final part draws conclusions 
regarding the results of the evaluative work and offers recom-
mendations for possible future evaluation programs (Chapter 4).
1  In this report the generic term German development cooperation (GDC) refers to development assistance that has been funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) only. The term “German development assistance” refers to development efforts supported by other or all five German ministries active in Afghanistan.
2  In German: Auswärtiges Amt (AA), Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg), Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI), Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (BMEL).
3  Outlined in Annex A.
2.
GDC’S PORTFOLIO  
IN AFGHANISTAN
2.  |  GDC’s Portfolio in Afghanistan 4
G
ermany has a long history of friendly relations 
with Afghanistan, reaching much further back than 
recent German development assistance efforts 
following the fall of the Taliban Government in 
2002. Germany has repeatedly taken a leading role in supporting 
Afghanistan’s development efforts, and is now the third largest 
bilateral contributor after the USA and Japan.4
Germany’s engagement in Afghanistan has thus been extensive. 
Among all countries supported by GDC worldwide, Afghanistan 
receives the largest amount of development cooperation com-
mitments. Up to 2012 Germany committed more than 2 billion 
euros in Afghanistan for development cooperation (including 
the BMZ contribution to the overall funding at about 1.58 billion 
euros) and has since committed to continue providing further 
funds.5 A significant increase in development funding to Afghani-
stan was first announced at the London Conference in 2010, with 
Germany raising its contribution to 430 million euros annually 
(250 million euros channeled through BMZ and 180 million euros 
channeled through the Federal Foreign Office.) At the Tokyo 
Conference in 2012 Germany committed to maintaining this level 
of development funding through 2016 (based on the condition 
that reforms will be achieved by the Afghan Government as 
outlined in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework.) 6 How-
ever, political interest has already indicated that Germany would 
like to stay engaged throughout the transformation decade until 
2024.7 Afghanistan will also remain a priority country for GDC, 
meaning that the full range of development policy instruments 
will continue to be implemented. 
As the largest provider of development funds of all European 
countries, Germany’s financial engagement in Afghanistan 
started with 80 million euros annually in 2002. In 2007, this com-
mitment was raised to 148 million euros, with another increase to 
208 million euros in 2008.
These augmentations occurred parallel to an increased military 
presence in Afghanistan, and underpinned a networked security 
approach adopted by the involved German Federal ministries. 
The term networked security refers to the alignment and coor-
dination of outcomes and activities among the German federal 
ministries. The approach of networked security is not a formal 
4  The US provides an estimated 2 billion USD annually for development cooperation in Afghanistan, while Japan’s contribution stands at 600 million USD annually, compared to the current German 
contribution of 430 million euros annually (Bundesregierung 2012: 9).
5  BMZ (2013a).
6  AA (2013b).
7  AA (2014), BMZ (2014) and Zürcher et al. (2013: 1).
Figure 1: Value of overall German Development Assistance in Afghanistan (2005-2011)
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policy of the German government. However, a joint document 
by the AA, BMVg, BMI, and BMZ (2011) outlines the approach 
in more detail.8 In alignment with Germany’s responsibility 
within the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), much, 
though not all, of Germany’s development cooperation efforts 
have been focused on Northern Afghanistan, as shown in Figure 
2 highlighting where the German Federal Armed Forces (Bunde-
swehr) are stationed.
2.1
Evolution of the GDC Portfolio in Afghanistan  
since 2002
Along with the first projects for achieving structural develop-
ment objectives, in the beginning overall German assistance in 
Afghanistan had a strong focus on “short-term measures and 
meeting urgent needs”.9 Thus, humanitarian and emergency 
assistance programs were implemented, focusing on addressing 
the immediate needs of the population in a post-conflict 
environment. A quarter of the programs concentrated on refugee 
relief, humanitarian aid, winter survival and basic social services, 
while three quarters addressed structural development objec-
tives. Additionally, Germany agreed to relieve the Government 
of Afghanistan of a substantial amount of its bilateral debt and 
has forgiven a total amount of 78.56 million euros.10 In addition to 
the measures taken in the area of humanitarian and emergency 
assistance BMZ selected three sectors in the fall of 2002 in which 
support was mainly to be provided: (i) Energy, (ii) Sustainable 
Economic Development, and (iii) Water and Sanitation. These 
three sectors remained the central focus of efforts until January 
8  For a detailed discussion on the approach see the supplement edition of Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik from Oktober 2012.
9  AA (n.d.).
10  BMZ (2013a).
Figure 2. Map of Afghanistan highlighting GDC’s areas of operation 
Source: DEval created, based  
upon AIMS template 
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of 2005, when Education was added as a fourth priority area at 
the request of the Afghan government. During the Government 
Consultation in 2012, good governance was adopted as a 
fifth priority area. This engagement was aimed at enhancing 
underlying political conditions which are apparently required for 
the effectiveness of sector operations.11 While 25.2 % of BMZ’s 
portfolio between 2007 and 2010 was committed to humanitar-
ian and emergency aid, this percentage dropped to only 3.6 % 
between 2010 and 2013. This indicates a significant shift in focus 
towards institution building and more long-term development 
objectives.12
Germany aligns its development cooperation strategy and pri-
orities with those of the Afghan government. Representatives of 
the German government, via the BMZ, conduct negotiations with 
the Government of Afghanistan on an annual basis to discuss 
and prioritize development efforts. One unique aspect of this 
country context is that upon request of the Afghan government 
the German Federal Foreign Office presented its activities as part 
of the government negotiations. Further rounds of consultations 
are convened every six months. This regular engagement ensures 
that focal sectors remain relevant and of priority to the Gov-
ernment of Afghanistan and it allows for a quick realignment of 
efforts when deemed necessary by both governments. While the 
high flexibility in (re-)aligning priorities has proven to be useful 
in a fast changing and volatile environment like Afghanistan, it 
also provides challenges to the continuity in programming and 
longer-term planning.13
The security situation in Afghanistan drives and determines 
the pace, direction and approach of development cooperation 
in each sector. BMZ and its implementing organizations have 
been cognizant of the threat insecurity poses to its development 
efforts and adopted a conflict sensitive approach in all its opera-
tions. This approach is further supported by a Risk Management 
Office (RMO) that provides continuous support to projects and 
staff.
More recently a strategic portfolio review (Zürcher et al. 
2013) commissioned by the BMZ in 2012 and published in 2013 
assessed the shock resistance of GDC funded projects. The 
review concluded that about 51 % of the GIZ and 46 % of the KfW 
portfolios are at risk or even at high risk of not being finalized 
or continued, if the security situation deteriorates. Two energy 
infrastructure projects and the Kunduz-Khulm road project 
were classified as being at high risk. The authors of the strategic 
portfolio review recommend to decrease the number of projects 
with higher risk ratings and to pay more attention to making the 
portfolio more shock resistance. This means reducing the number 
of infrastructure projects that only become operational once “the 
last screw has been tightened”.14 The review also categorizes each 
project of the GDC portfolio into three “instruments”, namely 
flexible projects, classical projects, and multi-donor trust funds 
(MDTF).15 In 2013 classical projects accounted for 31.1 % of the 
portfolio; projects with flexible funding accounted for 43.1 % of 
the portfolio; 25.8 % of funds were channeled through MDTF. 
The number of projects with flexible funding has decreased by 
approx. 10 % over the last three years. The authors of the strate-
gic portfolio review recommend increasing projects with flexible 
funding again, as they judge them to be particularly suitable for 
areas with volatile security issues.16
2.2
BMZ Priority Sectors in Afghanistan
The new BMZ strategy for development cooperation in Afghan-
istan (2014a) aims at building an Afghan state that guarantees 
human rights and security and is accepted by the people of 
Afghanistan as the legitimate representative and service provider 
of basic needs. Such a state provides sound legal protection, 
11  AA (n.d.), Bundesregierung (2012: 36); Zürcher et al. (2007c: 23).
12  Zürcher et al. (2013: 6).
13  Interviews October 9, 2013 and October 24, 2013. Respondents of key informant interviews were assured that the information they provided would remain confidential. Therefore, all interviews are cited only 
using dates, and sometimes information is given about whether the individual was providing an internal or external perspective.
14  Zürcher et al. (2013: 11 – 15; 20).
15  The term „classical“ here refers to the perceived standard set-up of GIZ and KfW projects or programs. According to Zürcher et al. (2013) “flexible” means that funds can be allocated and spent flexibly, often 
based on a participatory decision-making process of a community or an administrative entity.Examples of programs with flexible funding are the RCDF and RIDF. MDTF are funds, to which international 
donors make financial contributions and under which their activities are coordinated (Zürcher et al. 2013: 7 – 9). DEval does not necessarily share this threefold distinction.
16  Zürcher et al. (2013: 9; 22).
7 GDC’s Portfolio in Afghanistan  |  2.
fosters political voices, as well as enables social and economic 
participation. BMZ support helps to (i) improve the effectiveness 
of state institutions at the national, provincial, district and com-
munity level, (ii) promote development in rural areas, (iii) supply 
more reliable energy, (iv) increase access to safe drinking water, 
(v) enhance general conditions for employment creation, (vi) and 
improve education. Strengthening democracy, rule of law, human 
rights and the fight against corruption are also an integral part of 
the German-Afghan cooperation.
The aforementioned five priority sectors have been identified to 
achieve these objectives. The following provides an overview of 
the activities in these priority sectors.17
Energy
Within the energy sector, GDC has focused on improving the 
electricity supply for rural areas via renewable energies and on 
providing support and training to the national energy supply 
company. In this regard GDC has co-financed the establishment 
of power lines extending from Uzbekistan into Afghanistan to 
bring reliable electricity to selected areas of the country. Addi-
tionally, Germany has financed the (re-)construction of electricity 
facilities, including hydropower stations, substations, and a 
solar plant.18 Germany’s engagement in the energy sector has 
increased from 10.3 % in 2007 – 2010, to 18.8 % in 2010 – 2013.19 
Sustainable Economic Development
GDC has contributed to fostering a market economy in Afghan-
istan via the promotion of a conducive economic framework 
and by setting up new financial institutions. GIZ and KfW have 
provided advisory services on investment and trade, and on the 
promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). GDC 
supported the setup of the First Microfinance Bank (FMFB), 
which provides loans to individual borrowers and SMEs, and 
the establishment of a credit guarantee facility financed by the 
Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG). GDC 
also contributed to the establishment of the Afghan Investment 
Support Agency (AISA), a one-stop-shop for individuals and 
companies looking to invest in Afghanistan. Additionally, GDC 
supported vocational training, with an emphasis on linking such 
training to job placement services. Furthermore, infrastructure 
projects (e.g. the national road from Kunduz to Khulm) are 
implemented by the KfW. The BMZ commitments to the priority 
sector Sustainable Economic Development has increased from 
4.6 % in 2007 – 2010 to 20.8 % in 2010 – 2013, the largest increase 
by percentage across the portfolio. However, this portfolio has 
also been assessed as having the largest share of “at risk” or 
“high risk” projects by the strategic portfolio review.20
Water and Sanitation
Germany is the leading international donor to urban water 
supply efforts in Afghanistan. Funded projects in this sector have 
focused on establishing the proper infrastructure for providing 
clean drinking water supply systems in the large cities of Kabul, 
Herat, and Kunduz, with ongoing projects in Balkh and smaller 
cities.21 Additionally, GDC is working with local water supply 
companies and the Afghan Ministry of Energy and Water to 
reform the water sector, including legislation and regulations to 
improve resource management, access to water, and the planning 
of wastewater disposal.22 Support within the BMZ portfolio 
for water and sanitation has increased from 7.9 % of the total 
portfolio in 2007 – 2010 to 12.8 % in 2010 – 2013.23
Education
GDC is providing assistance to the development of the Afghan 
education system with a focus on basic and vocational education. 
GDC assisted in establishing a national teacher training curric-
ulum, conducting teacher training and building model schools. 
Germany has contributed to the construction of a teacher 
training college, training centers, dorms, and residence halls.24 
17  More detailed and verified information on the BMZ portfolio in Afghanistan is provided in the strategic portfolio review (Zürcher et al. 2013: 4 – 15).
18  Bundesregierung (2012: 40); Zürcher et al. (2007c: 23).
19  Zürcher et al. (2013: 6).
20  Zürcher et al. (2013: 6; 14).
21  Bundesregierung (2012a: 41).
22  GIZ (2013b).
23  Zürcher et al. (2013: 6).
24  Bundesregierung (2012: 36).
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It has also financed the (re-)construction of over 550 primary and 
secondary schools.25 Additionally, GIZ advisors have worked with 
the Afghan Ministry of Education (MoE) at both national and 
provincial levels to prepare for institutional reforms in the sector. 
Furthermore, GDC supports the Education Quality Improvement 
Program, which is financed under the Afghanistan Reconstruc-
tion Trust Fund (ARTF). BMZ support for the education sector 
accounted for 18.4 % of the portfolio between 2007 and 2010, and 
13.1 % of the portfolio between 2010 and 2013.26 
Governance
Public sector reform is a priority for the Afghan Government and 
is therefore stipulated in the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS). BMZ supports the implementation of the 
ANDS via the Open Policy Advisory Fund (OPAF). The fund’s 
objective is to enhance governance at the central and subnation-
al levels in key reform areas by assisting state actors in designing 
and improving processes, strategies and regulations, as well as 
by conducting training to increase communication and enhance 
cooperation between government bodies. 
The OPAF is complemented by two additional funds, which aim 
at strengthening the capacity of government officials to plan and 
implement development activities effectively. Activities financed 
by the Regional Capacity Development Fund (RCDF) and the 
Regional Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) concentrate 
on improving the economic and social infrastructure at the pro-
vincial and district levels. Infrastructure projects, which enhance 
people’s quality of life, are combined with capacity development 
measures in order to strengthen public confidence in govern-
mental institutions and elected representatives. The objective of 
the funds is to build up and consolidate efficient, legitimate and 
citizen-oriented governance structures at a sub-national level. 
By 2012, 109 infrastructure and capacity development projects 
were approved by the Provincial Development Councils for 
implementation and 182 capacity development training courses 
were conducted for over 11,600 civil servants. Additionally, the 
construction or rehabilitation of roads, bridges and irrigation 
canals in all five provinces continue to support local farmers and 
villages by increasing economic output. In Kunduz and Baghlan, 
56.6 kilometers of newly constructed overhead transmission 
lines, which now supply electricity to people in the villages, 
continue to improve the quality of life and support economic 
growth throughout the area. 17 public administrative buildings 
have also been built to better enable public institutions to fulfill 
their tasks at both provincial and district levels.27 These projects 
have been supported through the two funds, implemented by 
GIZ and KfW respectively. 
A third area of engagement in the governance sector focuses 
on the rule of law. Programs aim at enhancing legal security for 
citizens, especially women, by providing assistance to judiciary 
and administrative staff at both central and provincial levels.28 
Next to bilateral programs and projects, GDC also contributes 
to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which is a 
multilateral trust fund supported by 33 donors and administered 
by the World Bank. It was established in 2002 to “provide a 
coordinated financing mechanism for the Government of Afghan-
istan’s budget and its priority national investment projects.” 29 
The ARTF has provided 6.74 billion USD in funds, with Germany 
contributing 461 million USD, or just below 7 % of the total 
funds.30 This trust fund offers two windows to which donors can 
provide funding: an investment window under which all programs 
are covered (including the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), 
and the Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP)) and 
a recurrent cost window, which pays salaries for government 
employees and running costs. This window is the largest 
single source of “on-budget” financing for the Government of 
Afghanistan. Germany contributes to the ARTF since 2002 with 
increasing amounts, running at 40 million euros in 2013.31 The 
German funds support mainly the EQUIP, the NSP, and the salary 
25  Bundesregierung (2012: 37).
26  Interview August 28, 2013.
27  GIZ (2013b).
28  GIZ (2013b).
29  World Bank (2013b).
30  World Bank (2013a: 5).
31  KfW (2014).
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scheme financed under the ARTF. Several internal and three 
external evaluations assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the ARTF draw mainly positive conclusions.32 Multi Donor Trust 
Funds (MDTF) in general are currently being considered to be a 
viable and attractive instrument for donors in the fragile state 
context, particularly given that investment and implementation 
risks can be spread across a wider range of donors. 
Although BMZ’s total support to the governance sector stood 
at 33.7 % of the portfolio in 2007 – 2010, it has decreased to just 
29.1 % of the portfolio in 2010 – 2013.33
Additional Areas of Focus (Gestaltungsspielraum)
Emergency and Transitional Aid has certainly been another 
focus area for GDC, particularly in the beginning of the German 
engagement in Afghanistan. However, these programs have been 
considerably reduced after GDC’s transition towards longer-term 
development objectives in 2010 and the shift of main parts 
of this portfolio to the AA in 2012. Although these programs 
accounted for 25,2 % of the overall GDC funding between 2007 
– 2010, only two larger emergency programs have remained 
part of the BMZ portfolio: the previous Development-Oriented 
Emergency and Transition Aid (ENÜH), which will end in 2013, is 
now continued in its new form as Development-Supporting and 
Structure-Forming Transition Aid (ESÜH).34 Presently, emergency 
and transitional aid only account for 0.5 % of the portfolio in the 
year 2013, reflecting the change in division of labor between BMZ 
and AA in 2012.
Programs for Gender Mainstreaming, a disaster preparedness 
program in the province of Badakhshan, a fund for peace-building 
efforts and a food security project in Baglan are also additional 
efforts supported by GDC.35
2.3
Overview of Projects Implemented by GIZ and KfW  
in Afghanistan
Five German federal ministries are actively supporting develop-
ment efforts in Afghanistan: the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Federal Ministry 
of Defense (BMVg), the Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI), the 
Federal Foreign Office (AA), and the Federal Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (BMEL).36 The BMZ and the AA are the two largest 
funding sources of German development assistance in Afghan-
istan, with an annual commitment of 430 million.37 Further 
German ministries (BMVg, BMI, BMEL) and federal states are also 
involved in development assistance in Afghanistan; however, to a 
much lesser extent.
While there is a certain division of labor among and within the 
sectors in which the AA and BMZ are operating, their program 
rationale and rules for funding differ substantially. The AA 
provides funding for development projects in Afghanistan that 
are designed to “respond quickly, selectively, and visibly to Af-
ghanistan’s serious problems.” 38 These projects are shorter-term 
in nature than those undertaken by the BMZ, and are grounded 
in foreign and security policy concerns.39 The AA priorities in 
Afghanistan lie in security sector reform, stabilization projects, 
and capacity development within the administrative and judicial 
system. Additional projects are funded in areas of health, air 
traffic, governance (promotion of human rights and support to 
the election process), higher education, and the preservation 
of Afghan cultural heritage. The AA also supports the “Heart 
of Asia” process, which promotes regional cooperation with 
neighboring countries. The total AA portfolio – at a worth of 
180 million euros annually – accounted to almost 41 % of overall 
German development assistance in 2013.40
32  For a more detailed discussion of the ARTF as a successful instrument for aid to Afghanistan see KfW (2013); Zürcher et al. (2013: 23); World Bank (2013b) and Sud (2013: 17).
33  Zürcher et al. (2013: 6; 22 – 23).
34  In German: Entwicklungsorientierte Not- und Übergangshilfe (ENÜH) and Entwicklungsfördernde und Strukturbildende Übergangshilfe (ESÜH).
35  Zürcher et al. (2013: 7 – 8); GIZ (2013b).
36  Coordination among the five German Ministries active in Afghanistan has not an explicit part of this review, but it was addressed as an issue during many interviews among all stakeholder groups. 
Therefore, the authors have chosen to include the raised issues of coordination, particularly those regarding the M&E system.
37  BMZ (2014a: 11).
38  AA (2013b).
39  Internal Document #2.
40  Internal Document #1; BMZ (2014a: 13).
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Both the BMZ and the AA rely mainly on the German implement-
ing agencies, GIZ and KfW, as well as some non-governmental 
organizations for conducting activities on the ground.41 The 
multi-faceted structure of actors in German development assis-
tance in Afghanistan ensures a high standard of sector expertise 
and advisory services to the Afghan people. However, it also 
bears some challenges: several interview partners referred to a 
perceived lack of coordination among the German ministries, 
particularly regarding development objectives and approaches. 
The varying degrees of commitments to transparency and 
data-sharing of the work supported by each ministry were also 
cited as complicating the matter. While overviews of all develop-
ment efforts supported by the German government in Afghani-
stan are at hand via the progress reports (Fortschrittsberichte) 
and other official material, these sources do not distinguish 
among the intervening ministries nor explain their division of 
labor and various modes of intervention.
The lack of coordination and alignment among German minis-
tries regarding their specific objectives, approaches and applied 
instruments is particularly difficult for the implementing agencies 
to manage, as they implement projects to the Afghan people for 
all German ministries. GIZ and KfW staff stated in interviews 
that competing preferences on time lines and approaches have 
made their work more difficult and are likely to impede their 
effectiveness.42
In the following, the projects implemented by GIZ and KfW in 
Afghanistan are briefly outlined. As mentioned above, both 
organizations receive funding from the BMZ and the AA for 
project financing and implementation. It is this duality (if not 
multiplicity) of funders, objectives and approaches, which shapes 
the portfolio of German development assistance in Afghanistan, 
so that the work of both institutions is presented here together.
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
KfW has financed 56 projects / programs in Afghanistan since 
2002, an amount worth over 1 billion euros. Funding for these 
projects / programs has come mainly from the BMZ and covered 
about two-thirds of the projects and programs.43 The AA has 
funded the additional 20 % of KfW’s portfolio, hence one-third of 
the projects.
When KfW first started working in Afghanistan in 2002, most 
projects focused on emergency relief, in accordance with the 
BMZ and the AA strategic priorities as mentioned above. This 
shifted in 2005, with KfW beginning to finance larger infrastruc-
ture projects, more in alignment with their work worldwide. The 
volume of KfW’s project portfolio in Afghanistan jumped from 
around 106 million euros in 2009 to almost 247 million euros 
in 2010. Since then, the volume decreased again, with just over 
152 million euros in 2012.44 The largest percentage of financing 
between 2007 and 2012 occurred in the priority sector govern-
ance, followed by sustainable economic development, education, 
water and sanitation. 
KfW’s assistance in the governance sector focuses on support to 
the public administration in implementing development projects 
in rural areas. Financing occurs via a regional bilateral fund, the 
RIDF, and the multilateral ARTF (here in particular the NSP of the 
ARTF). Additionally, a conflict prevention project concentrated 
on the border regions of Afghanistan-Pakistan and Afghanistan- 
Tajikistan has been funded by the AA.
Most projects / programs are financed over a number of years, 
stretching between one to five years, with an average of 2.9 
years. Project / program budgets range in size from around 
500,000 euros to over 48 million euros.45
41  From 2011 onward the implementation through the GIZ includes services provided by CIM (Center for International Migration and Development), DED (German Development Service), GTZ (German 
Agency for Technical Cooperation), and InWent (Capacity Building International).
42  Interviews, October 9, October 23, October 29, November 3, 2013.
43  See Annex E for details.
44  KfW (2013). The given numbers represent the amounts of new commitments per year.
45  Data presented on project volume and duration require some reservation. Projects with larger volumes might subsume a range of smaller projects, which have not been listed as such. The duration can refer 
to the actual physical implementation, to building time of a project, or to the time between commitments and the final report. This is not distinguished in the Excel sheet in Annex E.
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Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ)
GIZ has implemented 83 projects / programs in Afghanistan since 
2002, with 60 projects currently ongoing.46 The main focus of GIZ 
work is on “improving living conditions, especially for the rural 
population” (GIZ 2013a). GIZ manages projects and programs in 
eight areas: Energy, Sustainable Economic Development, Water 
and Sanitation, Education, Emergency and Transitional Aid, 
Health, Good Governance, and the Civil Peace Service.47 
As was noted for KfW, the bulk of GIZ funding stemmed from 
the BMZ, accounting for almost 400 million euros between 2002 
and 2013 and serving 57 % of their projects. The remaining funds 
came mainly from the AA. In 2008, AA funding began to play a 
stronger role in GIZ’s portfolio, rising to a height of 51.32 million 
euros in 2011 (47 % of the GIZ portfolio for that year). It has since 
decreased, accounting for 14.79 million euros in 2013 (20 % of the 
GIZ portfolio for 2013) as shown in Figure 4 below.
46  See Annex E for details; GIZ (2013a).
47  GIZ (2013a).
Figure 3: KfW implemented projects funded by BMZ and AA in Afghanistan by Sector and Year (millions of Euros)
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In total, AA funding accounts for 33 % of GIZ disbursements to 
Afghanistan since 2002.
Figure 5 presents the BMZ portfolio implemented by GIZ and 
reflects the allocation of funding against the five GDC priority 
areas.
Figure 4: GIZ implemented projects funded by BMZ and AA in Afghanistan by Year
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48  The column „other“ includes projects under the heading “Gestaltungsspielraum”.
If one compares the GIZ program funded by BMZ with the one 
funded by the AA, the prevalence of sectors shift. GIZ’s largest 
sector (by volume) under the BMZ portfolio is governance. The 
priority shifts to security when AA funded projects are included. 
The security projects include efforts to support the Afghan 
National Police (ANP). Governance has been supported by both 
ministries and receives the second highest amount of funding. 
Nevertheless, in accordance with the GDC priority sectors in 
Afghanistan, further projects / programs have been implemented 
in the sectors of sustainable economic development, education, 
water and sanitation, and energy. Smaller amounts of money 
have been invested in health, peace, and agriculture, as shown in 
Figure 6 below.
Figure 5: GIZ projects in Afghanistan by Sector and Value (BMZ funded)
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Summary
BMZ funds to Afghanistan increased continuously over time, 
with two steep rises in 2007 and 2010. The jumps correspond 
with a stronger German military presence in Afghanistan under 
the ISAF mandate and reflect an alignment of military and civil-
ian support to the country (referred to as the networked security 
approach.) GDC priorities in Afghanistan have also changed 
over time; while a quarter of the portfolio focused originally on 
emergency and relief efforts, this has since shifted from 2009 / 10 
onward toward a stronger emphasis on institution building and 
structural change. Such a shift implies longer-term development 
objectives and project duration. The reallocation of funds within 
the portfolio benefited mainly programs and projects in the 
sustainable economic development sector, which grew from 
4.6 % in 2010 to 20.8 % in 2013, followed by energy and water. 
Programs with the highest funding volume are in the governance 
sector. Here funding is channeled via bilateral (RCDF and RIDF) 
and multi-lateral funds (ARTF).
A comprehensive list of all German development projects and 
programs in Afghanistan was not readily available. The informa-
tion upon which the analysis is based has been provided by the 
two implementing agencies and has not been formally validated 
by either BMZ or AA. Accordingly, as acknowledged by the 
implementing agencies themselves, the degree of validity of the 
information might be limited.49
How and to what extent evaluations have informed adjustments 
to the GDC portfolio or underpinned the recommendations 
of the strategic portfolio review in 2013 will be the subject of 
the following chapter. Here the report will review the kind of 
evaluative work that has been conducted by the BMZ, KfW and 
GIZ and mirror these efforts against those undertaken by other 
international development partners in Afghanistan (chapter 
3.1). Thereafter, the utilization of evaluative works conducted by 
GDC actors will be discussed, before summarizing the key results 
(chapter 3.2).
49  E-mail correspondence from 20.01.2014.
Figure 6: GIZ projects in Afghanistan by Sector and Value (AA and BMZ funded)
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C
ollecting evaluative work by German actors in 
Afghanistan reveals that there is little standardization 
across the German federal ministries regarding 
monitoring and evaluation requirements.50 While the 
BMZ has specific and clearly outlined monitoring and evaluation 
requirements for its implementing partners, the AA is focuses 
more on monitoring than evaluation. For example, KfW conducts 
ex-post evaluations for its BMZ-funded projects; however, this is 
not a requirement for AA-funded operations.51 Both ministries do 
require some form of regular reporting on project / program pro-
gress, but even here they follow different formats for reporting. 
These different rules and approaches make it difficult to establish 
a comprehensive and complete picture of all of the evaluative 
work conducted for German development assistance in Afghan-
istan over the last 12 years. This is, next to DEval’s currently 
limited mandate, a second reason why this review confines itself 
mainly to the evaluative work conducted on behalf of the BMZ.
The review of evaluative work of GDC in Afghanistan comprises 
the assessment of three different elements: (i) project level work, 
(ii) the Monitoring and Evaluation system, and (iii) strategic level 
work. It is based on an extensive document analysis and a set of 
key informant interviews.52
3.1
Features of GDC’s Evaluative Work in Afghanistan
Afghanistan is not like any other developing country, even in a 
fragile state context. Since the reengagement of the international 
community in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban, there 
has been intense political pressure for quick development results. 
There are not only high stakes to demonstrate success within 
the international political arena, but also at the national level 
in Afghanistan, as well as in Germany. Since the beginning of 
international engagement, public reaction to the military mission 
in Afghanistan has been controversial in Germany with strongly 
opposing views in the German Bundestag. The intense pressure 
on the German government to show quick development results 
has continued even after development efforts clearly began to 
shift in 2010.
The high political attention given to development progress in 
Afghanistan has influenced not only the kind of interventions 
selected, but also how they have been assessed. It reinforced 
a focus in the evaluative work on outputs (rather than on 
outcomes or impacts) at the project level (rather than on a 
more strategic sector or country level), much to the chagrin of 
concerned divisions within the development ministry. Monitoring 
and evaluation systems (M&E) have been designed in a manner 
that allow for these outputs to be easily extracted in order to 
demonstrate progress in implementing development projects. 
As a consequence of this emphasis very little is known about 
whether GDC funded projects currently achieve the intended 
effects, i.e. intended outcomes and impacts.53
Outputs generally refer to the immediate effects of a resource 
investment, such as the number of constructed wells or schools, 
the number of government officials trained, etc. Outputs are 
rather easily quantifiable, and therefore a popular means of 
reporting on development progress. However, these outputs re-
flect only one aspect of development achievement, which should 
also include progress toward second- and third-level objectives, 
known as outcomes and impacts. Therefore, understanding 
outputs only provides a limited picture of the success or failure 
of a development project. For example, just having built a school 
does not automatically mean that children attend classes and 
are learning. A myriad number of issues can arise which prevent 
the school from being able to provide quality education to the 
children. In an environment like Afghanistan, it is possible that 
security concerns prevent parents from allowing their children to 
attend school; there might not be an educated teacher available, 
etc. Therefore, only knowing how many schools have been built is 
only a first indicator of success for a school construction project. 
Understanding how this has led to specific outcomes (e.g. an 
increase in the number of children attending school and earning 
a degree) and impacts (e.g. increased contribution of former 
50  Interviews October 9, November 3, November 8, and November 10, 2013.
51  Interviews October 9, 2013.
52  For more details on the applied methodology see Annex A.
53  Results include all outputs, outcomes and impacts, while effects are defined as just outcomes and impacts (OECD 2010a).
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students to their households’ economy) provides essential 
information on the success or failure of a development project.
Given this understanding, output-focused evaluations at the 
project level have a limited informative value in comparison to 
strategic and outcome- or impact-focused evaluations. However, 
as mentioned above, the evaluative work reviewed has a strong 
focus on outputs at the project level. Nevertheless, this evalua-
tive work has been useful for project management. Indeed, BMZ, 
GIZ and KfW colleagues stated in interviews that the available 
evaluation findings have informed project / program management 
to a sufficient degree at the operational level.54
3.1.1 Project and Program Level Evaluative Work
The term evaluation is defined by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) as “the systematic 
and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, 
program or policy, its design, implementation and results.” 55 
Evaluations in international development focus on assessing the 
relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of 
an intervention. Evaluations can serve very different purposes 
and audiences: 
 • Evaluation findings can be used to serve donors’ and decision 
makers’ requirements for due diligence and control. This 
stresses the accountability function of evaluation.
 • Evaluation findings can also focus on stimulating learning 
at the operational and strategic level and / or on stimulating 
change within a system. 
 • Evaluation can review achievements at the output-level or the 
outcome- and impact-level. 
 • Evaluation can focus directly on the project / program level, 
or it can take a more aggregated perspective, for example, 
by looking at the effects within a sector, a country portfolio, 
a strategy, or an instrument of development cooperation as 
applied across various sectors. 
 • Accordingly, evaluation findings can be used to directly im-
prove project / program implementation or to inform strategic 
decisions made at the level of the donors or the government. 
The different purposes of evaluation lead to different evaluation 
designs, implementation processes, and often to different types 
of results. The BMZ guidelines for technical and financial coop-
eration clearly outline framing conditions for all evaluations to 
be conducted. Agencies which implement projects on behalf of 
the BMZ are thereby required to conduct evaluations of finalized 
projects to a sufficient degree in accordance with OECD-DAC 
standards.56 Thus, one could expect to find a significant number 
of evaluations within a large project portfolio, as in the case of 
Afghanistan. 
Upon request, BMZ, KfW, and GIZ provided a list of their project- 
and program-level evaluative work to DEval. This list comprises 
of 127 reports; some of which are evaluations according to 
OECD / DAC criteria, most of which only include elements of an 
evaluation and are therefore considered to be evaluative work 
in the following. From this compilation, 37 project documents 
were selected as evaluative work, including ex-post evaluations, 
impact assessments, project progress reviews and e-VAL 
reports.57 Additionally, annual reports, final reports and audits 
have been listed by GIZ as reports that inform their M&E system 
in Afghanistan. However, these reports were not considered for 
this review.
The full body of evaluative assessments conducted by GIZ and 
KfW in Afghanistan since 2002 comprises of 21 project progress 
reviews (GIZ), 10 e-VAL reports (GIZ), two project level impact as-
sessments (by GIZ) and four finalized ex-post evaluations (KfW). 
GIZ leads the list of reports with 33 pieces of work. They cover 
21 projects out of a total of 50 projects implemented for BMZ in 
Afghanistan since 2002, meaning that at least one element of 
evaluative work has been conducted on 42 % of the projects.58 
54  Interviews August 28, October 9, and October 14, 2013.
55  OECD (2010a: 21).
56  BMZ (2008: 27).
57  The e-VAL is a computer-based interview tool used to capture the opinions and feedback of various project / program stakeholders (Internal Document #3).
58  This data is based on portfolio Excel sheets for GIZ’s BMZ and AA portfolios. A full list of evaluations conducted was provided by the GIZ in November 2013.
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Four evaluations from KfW are included in the list, which cover 
3 projects out of a total of 38 implemented for BMZ since 2002, 
equaling a coverage of evaluations to projects at about 8 %.59
From the 37 reports selected as evaluative work, a sample of 11 
reports was drawn and analyzed according to specific criteria as 
outlined in Annex C. The limitation to 11 reports was in response 
to the time and budget constraints of this review. The selection 
criteria applied ensured that an equal number of reports per 
category were reviewed. Thus, three project progress reviews, 
two e-VAL reports, four ex-post evaluations and two impact 
evaluations form the sample for the analysis.60
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) 
KfW utilizes an internally standardized evaluation approach 
for all of its BMZ funded projects / programs in Afghanistan 
in alignment with their approach for projects and programs 
worldwide. Each project / program has an equal chance of being 
randomly selected for an ex-post evaluation.61 The ex-post 
evaluations are conducted three to five years after the comple-
tion of a BMZ project, particularly in order to reappraise it. They 
address project identification, a needs assessment, operational 
experience, and outputs. Each year, KfW conducts 45 – 50 ex-post 
evaluations worldwide. The ex-post evaluations are conducted by 
either external consultants or KfW staff, who have never had any 
previous involvement with the respective project / program.
As of January 2014, KfW had completed four ex-post evaluations 
of projects / programs in Afghanistan for BMZ funded projects: 
two on microfinance banking, one on a multilateral trust fund, 
and one on water supply in Herat.62 All four ex-post evaluations 
were reviewed for this research in reference to their purpose, 
approach, implementation, and findings.63
Three of the four evaluations were conducted as desk studies, 
in contrast to most KfW ex-post evaluations, which are usually 
conducted as field studies. Security concerns were considered 
by KfW as the main deterrent for the teams for carrying out field 
studies. Therefore, most Afghanistan ex-post evaluations relied 
entirely upon development actors’ assessments of the projects / 
programs and reports from the Afghan government. This in turn 
means that the quality of these ex-post evaluations is based upon 
the quality of the documents which informed them. Unfortu-
nately, these sources were not always clearly and distinctly cited, 
leaving the reader with questions regarding the validity of the 
data sources. Given that finding accurate and reliable statistics 
in Afghanistan is difficult, and sometimes impossible, it is even 
more crucial to clearly cite the sources of the statistical data 
provided. For example, even standard demographic data provided 
by a single Afghan ministry can vary across reports.64
The use of standardized and clearly outlined evaluation criteria 
allow the reader to judge the validity and strength of the findings 
presented. Each of the KfW ex-post evaluations provided a 
performance rating on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, over-
arching development impact, and sustainability. Generally, the 
performance ratings given by the ex-post evaluation team were 
positive, with the lowest performance rates of three (or satisfac-
tory) for development impact in the ARTF ex-post evaluation, for 
sustainability in one of the FMFB ex-post evaluations, and for the 
overall rating of the Herat water supply project.65
In summary, the ex-post evaluations make an important con-
tribution to the assessment of GDC. They provide the reader 
with an extended view of what occurred after the project / 
program was completed. The four ex-post evaluations were able 
to provide positive statistics and examples indicating how the 
59  KfW applies a random sampling technique for the selection of projects subject to ex-post evaluations. 50 % (or more) of all completed projects are drawn annually for an ex-post evaluation. The low 
percentage of project to evaluation coverage (i.e. 8 %) reflects this random sampling process. However, in 2013 three additional KfW projects in Afghanistan have been selected for ex-post evaluation and in 
2014 seven further projects have been included in the sample. This will considerably increase the coverage percentage of projects subject to evaluation.
60  See Annex A for details on the methodology applied for the document review at the project level, Annex C for a detailed description of the assessment criteria, and Annex D for a presentation of the results 
of the assessment.
61  Interview October 9, 2013.
62  These evaluations looked at the First Microfinance Bank and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).
63  See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 1, 2, 3, and 4.
64  For example the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development has provided contradictory information regarding the number of villages that exist in the country with a difference of 18,000 villages in 
their National Solidarity Programme reports (Wilson, M.B. 2013).
65  See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 1, p. 6; # 2, p.1; and # 4, p. 1.
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three projects helped to support the development objectives of 
KfW and GDC at large. For example, the ex-post evaluation on 
the First Microfinance Bank found that the bank’s credit portfolio 
grew to 40.6 million USD, which exceeded the 14 million USD 
originally expected.66 Additionally, the bank exceeded its target 
of 20,000 borrowers by August of 2009, when they recorded 
36,927 borrowers.67 KfW division heads indicated that they found 
the ex-post evaluations to be informative. However, they were 
not widely used in Afghanistan to inform decision-making. This is 
in part because of the low volume of evaluations that have been 
conducted thus far and in part due to the timing of the evalua-
tions.68 The KfW state that with more ex-post evaluations to refer 
to, they will play a stronger role in decision-making at a more 
strategic level. By January 2014, an additional eleven projects 
were drawn for an ex-post evaluation.69
It was further discussed that, the exclusive use of ex-post 
evaluations by KfW may have limits, particularly in fragile state 
environments such as in Afghanistan. The delayed timing of 
ex-post evaluations can mean that the political context or the 
security situation in which the project / program was implement-
ed has changed so drastically, that lessons for future projects are 
hard to draw. Therefore, reconsidering the usefulness of ex-post 
evaluations as a core pillar of evaluative work for KfW is recom-
mended in the context of Afghanistan. Given that the conditions 
for project implementation in Afghanistan will continue to 
change over short periods of time, projects / programs might be 
better served by more formative and summative evaluations 
conducted during or just at the end of a project / program.
KfW staff interviewed for this review found evaluations from 
other donor agencies (i.e. the World Bank, the UK Department 
for International Development / DfID) to be useful for supporting 
their own stance on what they will undertake in projects in Af-
ghanistan. They also noted that they draw on other development 
cooperation actors’ evaluations in their own ex-post evaluations, 
as well as use them to help inform their own decisions within 
projects / programs. Examples mentioned were the World Bank’s 
country portfolio evaluation on Afghanistan and the World 
Bank’s evaluations on the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust 
Fund, both of which informed KfW’s own ex-post evaluation on 
the ARTF.70 
Ideas for strengthening KfW’s evaluative work in Afghanistan 
include more emphasis on primary data collection and more 
detailed sourcing and triangulation of the data from secondary 
sources. This would allow for more robustness in the conclusions 
and recommendations drawn. While conducting evaluative 
work is often seen as difficult, if not impossible due to issues of 
security in Afghanistan,71 the impact assessment by Zürcher et 
al (2007a, 2010) provides an example that such work can indeed 
be conducted with local research institutions. That fieldwork 
has been undertaken for one of the KfW ex-post evaluations 
in the rather insecure province of Herat is another example 
of this. Greater emphasis on extracting and highlighting more 
general lessons learned would allow for recommendations to be 
shared more easily. Overall, the KfW team appeared interested 
in evaluation and stated that their evaluative works provided 
them with enough information for making decisions. Thus, KfW 
staff indicated that it was satisfied with the evaluative efforts 
that have been undertaken by GDC in Afghanistan. However, in 
our judgment this assessment falls short of the accountability 
requirements of the BMZ portfolio.
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ)
GIZ submitted, upon request, a long list of 122 reports on its 
development cooperation efforts in Afghanistan to DEval. As 
of November 2013, GIZ had conducted 21 end of phase Project 
Progress Reviews (PPR) or Projektfortschrittskontrollen (PFK), 
66  See Annex D, Evaluation Report # 2, p. 2.
67  See Annex D, Evaluation Report # 2, p. 2.
68  Interview October 9, 2013.
69  In January 2014 the KfW informally shared their list of projects, that was drawn by the random sampling technique described above. The selection of projects in Afghanistan has not been confirmed by KfW 
management and is hence not listed here.
70  Interviews October 3, October 9, November 3, and November 8, 2013.
71  Ahmar and Kolbe (2013).
3.  |  Description and Review of the Evaluative Work 20
67 annual project progress reports or Projektfortschrittsberichte 
(PFB), 19 audits or Wirtschaftsprüfungen commissioned directly 
by the BMZ, ten online e-VAL reports, two impact studies, and 
three final reports or Schlussberichte (SB). Although GIZ does not 
classify annual project progress reports, audits, or final reports 
as evaluations (nor does DEval), they are instruments of the M&E 
system and have been actively used in Afghanistan.72
GIZ – Project Progress Reviews
The Project Progress Review (PPR) is considered to be the 
most commonly applied evaluative instrument within GIZ. The 
organization states that PPR reports are predominantly “used 
to promote systematic learning in projects and programs and 
throughout the GIZ”. 73 Independent assessments are not seen as 
a core objective for PPRs, which is clearly different from external 
evaluations. The PPRs are conducted at the end of each phase 
of an ongoing project / program to monitor and evaluate the 
activities of the project / program up to that point. The first of 
these reviews generally takes place a few years into a project’s / 
program’s implementation. The objective is to inform the future 
strategic direction of that project / program by looking at what 
has already occurred. This review is often the main piece of 
analysis used to inform the planning and (re)orientation of the 
next project / program phase. Additionally, these reports are 
aimed at identifying lessons learned, which can be used by the 
project / program and more widely within GIZ.74 These reports are 
conducted by external experts in collaboration with GIZ experts. 
The review is generally based on fieldwork, the results of the 
monitoring system, and the e-VAL studies (i.e. a software based 
assessment tool, which will be described below in more detail).
Three examples of PPRs out of the 21 conducted in Afghanistan 
were reviewed for this study.75 Each PPR was led by an external 
consultant, although with a reduced degree of independence, as 
one was involved in the planning of the project evaluated and 
another had many years of experience with GIZ. The reviews 
outlined the methodologies employed and included information 
on the sources of data, which were quite varied. Each of the 
PPRs clearly laid out the purpose of the work. They all utilized 
primary and secondary data sources, including interviews with 
GIZ project / program staff, government officials of Afghanistan, 
and other stakeholders. Secondary sources were clearly cited 
and information to judge their trustworthiness was provided. 
While the three reports vary in terms of type and quality, one 
aspect remains common to them: they generally addressed the 
output level of a project, while reference to the outcome level 
was very reduced and non-systematic. As mentioned above, even 
though it is challenging to evaluate outcomes and impacts of 
interventions in a conflict-ridden environment, efforts to do so 
are important in order to measure if, when and how interventions 
are succeeding or failing in such circumstances. The reports 
reviewed do not show that much effort has been made in this 
regard. Recommendations for project implementation in the 
next phase were thus made at the output level; for example, 
in indicating which components should be focused on when 
moving forward. Specific suggestions for certain activities were 
occasionally extended to include intended outcomes.76 Generally, 
limitations of the reviews were also discussed. On average, the 
PPRs were conducted over a period of less than four months, 
with the shortest evaluation lasting one and a half months and 
the longest eight months. These reports were seen by GIZ staff 
as having greatly informed projects / programs moving into the 
next phase. For example, the need to address gender issues with 
religious leaders was raised in a PPR in 2009. This proposal was 
integrated into the strategic plan of the Gender Mainstreaming 
project. The final project report of 2012 on the same project 
confirms that this suggestion had been adapted in practice.77 It is 
thus likely that the PPR recommendations from 2009 informed 
the design of the new project phase and also led to new activities 
of other GIZ projects.
72  It needs to be mentioned here, that KfW also issues annual project progress reports and final reports on their BMZ funded projects. Audits are also commissioned by BMZ on KfW projects. However, in 
response to the DEval request of all evaluative work, the organization itself did not list these reports as evaluative work.
73  (GIZ 2013f).
74  (GIZ 2013f).
75  See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 7, 9, and 11.
76  See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 9, p.18; and # 11, p.10.
77  See Annex D, Evaluation Report # 11.
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GIZ – e-VAL Studies
The “e-VAL” is a computer-based interview tool used to capture 
the opinions and feedback of various project / program stakehold-
ers. It is used to draw a deeper understanding of how a project 
has been implemented and to show how successful it is consid-
ered to be. Similar to the PPR, an e-VAL study is initiated by the 
program manager. E-VALs have been deployed in Afghanistan 
and other countries “to systematically collect relevant opinions, 
and to make it possible to summarize and compare them within 
a structured data format.” 78 The qualitative data gathered in an 
e-VAL is in turn used to provide further information for PPRs, 
final reports, and independent evaluations. Thus, e-VAL studies 
are not stand-alone reports and can only be referred to as part of 
evaluative work in a general sense.
Two out of ten e-VAL reports conducted in Afghanistan were 
reviewed for this assessment.79 In each of these pieces of work 
the purpose and criteria were clearly outlined. The inclusion of 
different stakeholders, such as GIZ staff, GIZ partners, Afghan 
government representatives, recipients of services, allowed 
for the gathering of different perspectives. The e-VAL model, 
although only a survey and reporting tool, also provides some 
insights on outcomes and impacts. The standardized computer 
model and an external evaluator establish a degree of independ-
ence. E-VAL results feed new voices and perspectives into the 
M&E system. They enhance its diversity. Though the computer-
ized data analysis is not always easy to follow, the quality of the 
work is seen as providing useful and grounded information.
GIZ – Impact Studies
GIZ also listed two reports, which were labeled impact studies.80 
However, the documentation provided does not allow for 
reviewing whether the work actually is impact analysis or not. 
Hence, the reports are mentioned in the following, although 
an assessment regarding the quality and relevance of the work 
cannot be provided.
The first document is a presentation of findings and recommen-
dations of a survey, clearly produced for a wider public audience. 
The objectives of the survey are stated as “analyzing and 
documenting the projects’ impact on women’s living conditions, 
establishing a set of lessons learnt and gathering further knowl-
edge on gender-relevant achievements so far.” 81 The publication 
outlines the criteria for the assessment. However, information 
was not given on the evaluation questions, the methodology 
applied, and on how the analysis was conducted. The second 
document is a presentation of two case studies, again without 
providing any further information on how the results have been 
obtained.
GIZ – Summary
A substantial range of evaluative work has been conducted by 
GIZ on projects in Afghanistan. However, all of this work remains 
solely at the project level and can only be considered internal 
evaluative work, which is initiated and steered – although not 
conducted – by the project or program manager. Project Progress 
Review reports are not regularly shared with other stakeholders, 
including BMZ. The documents reviewed were of relatively good 
quality, with the exception of the two publications labeled as 
impact studies. However, the work mainly addressed the output 
level of interventions and did not provide insights on whether 
intended effects have been achieved. The low level of informa-
tion available on outcomes and impacts was noted by GIZ staff 
as well.82 
GIZ has taken measures to strengthen the position of evaluation 
within its M&E system. There are efforts to make evaluations 
compulsory for all BMZ funded projects at the end of a project 
phase, including those in Afghanistan. A revised M&E system will 
be introduced in 2014. This new system will aim at strengthening 
the analysis and understanding of development effects within 
the organization and will include more evaluation designs which 
focus on outcome and impact level analysis. While the Project 
Progress Reviews have remained internal documents until today, 
78  Lüninghöner (2010).
79  See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 10 and 11.
80  See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 4 and # 5.
81  GIZ (2012: 5).
82  Interview October 24, 2013.
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the new system will expand their distribution and utilization to 
the BMZ and the public.
Evaluations which address social and economical outcomes and 
impacts of a project or program require more intensive data 
collection throughout the project cycle, starting with sound base-
line data. The availability of baseline information was mentioned 
in some of the work reviewed, but only rarely. Some evaluation 
reports pointed rather to the lack of baseline studies and how 
this has limited their efforts.83 Baseline studies are apparently 
not yet the norm in GIZ projects / programs in Afghanistan 
(not even for those projects which did not start as emergency 
projects), which hampers the wider application of outcome- and 
impact-level evaluations.
KfW and GIZ – Overall Summary
For KfW and GIZ, the security situation in Afghanistan has played 
a strong role in determining the scope and types of evaluative 
efforts undertaken. KfW staff, for example, stated clearly that 
they would not put the lives of their evaluators in danger for the 
sake of primary data collection.84 Household surveys, a standard 
means of obtaining evaluation data, were seen as very difficult to 
implement in Afghanistan. It remains ultimately a judgment call 
of the responsible decision-makers when and to what extent data 
collection is feasible in a conflict-ridden environment. Security 
concerns have often resulted in adopting other, and less ideal, 
evaluation designs.
The political attention to GDC efforts in Afghanistan has also 
influenced the types of evaluations that have been conducted. 
Pressure to quickly start projects and demonstrate rapid and 
continuous progress, with no time for preparatory work such as 
baseline studies predetermined the focus on outputs, rather than 
results. Several interviewees stated that political expectations 
of what could be accomplished via development cooperation 
projects in Afghanistan diverged from the reality on the ground.85 
Timeframes for achieving results were seen to be determined by 
political expectations, rather than by a valid assessment of the 
local situation.86
3.1.2 Monitoring Systems
Although conventionally referred to as Monitoring and Evalua-
tion (M&E) systems, in practice most of the emphasis has been 
on monitoring (i.e. on continuous observation, oversight and 
data gathering). This in turn strongly influences the quality and 
focus of subsequent evaluations. Because of this interdepend-
ence the following section will review the set-up of monitoring 
within the M&E systems applied in Afghanistan and see if 
any suggestions can be made to strengthen the link between 
Monitoring and Evaluation in German development work. 
M&E at the project level is considered to be the domain of the 
implementing agencies, and is not directly determined by the 
BMZ or the AA.87 This has led to the adoption of parallel M&E 
systems by the implementing agencies with differing modi oper-
andi and a high degree of variance on which and how monitoring 
data is collected among the projects. This will be outlined in 
more detail by reviewing KfW’s and GIZ’s M&E system below.
Main Features of the M&E System of the KfW in Afghanistan
The M&E-based reporting of KfW projects / programs is estab-
lished individually, with each project determining its own moni-
toring needs in alignment with the requirements of the donor.88 
Monitoring data is collected and processed by KfW’s implement-
ing partners and not by KfW staff themselves. Implementing 
partners are asked to use and support existing partner systems 
for monitoring as much as possible, which is in correspondence 
with the Paris Declaration aiming at strengthening partner 
systems. In general, KfW finances and supervises feasibility 
reports and engineering assessments as projects / programs 
commence and are implemented. The purpose of these docu-
ments is to demonstrate due diligence in project preparation and 
83  Evaluation Report # 8.
84  Interviews October 9, 2013.
85  Interviews October 14, 2013.
86  Interviews, October 14, October 24, and November 10, 2013.
87  Interviews October 9 and November 3, 2013.
88  Interview October 9, 2013.
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implementation. The annual reports, as well as the final reports, 
are based on project monitoring data, occasionally supplemented 
with additional data collection.
The following example provides an insight on how difficult it 
can be for implementing agencies to obtain sufficient data 
in a conflict affected country and to draw conclusions on the 
effectiveness of their projects: 
A final assessment of a roads project was not able to employ 
a robust enough sample to ground its findings due to the 
limited population of informants. Only six individuals 
participated in the household survey, which was then used 
to extract shifts in household earnings and other variables. 
While the report said that improvements in the area were 
causally related to the roads project, there was no support-
ive evidence indicating that the changes discussed by the 
six informants were actually directly related to the road 
built. The use of a full household survey was considered 
and could have dramatically improved the credibility of the 
findings, but security constraints prevented the team from 
carrying it out.89 
The project-focused approach to M&E and the management of 
monitoring data by third parties makes it difficult to see how 
this information can be systematically used for more aggregated 
issues, for example at the sector level.
Main Features of the M&E System of GIZ in Afghanistan
GIZ utilizes a results-based monitoring (RBM) system for its 
projects / programs in Afghanistan, as it does in all other coun-
tries. GIZ has published guidelines outlining the requirements 
of a RBM system and how to set up an M&E system. There are 
standardized general M&E guidelines and a supplement to these 
for fragile states, such as Afghanistan.90 However, as was noted 
in key informant interviews, each project is solely responsible 
for creating its M&E system, which has resulted in high variance 
of commitment and quality. According to actors both within and 
outside of GIZ, some M&E systems are strong and grounded in 
the RBM guidelines, while others are less so.91 One explanation 
given for the variance in the quality of M&E Systems in GIZ 
projects and programs in Afghanistan was the high rate of staff 
turnover. Shifts in the M&E systems often reflect the changing 
focus of new managers interested in setting their own standards 
and issues.92
As for KfW, a centralized M&E system does not exist at the sector 
level. While an M&E Unit was established in Kabul in 2010, its 
main tasks are managing the tracking system discussed below 
and providing trainings on M&E to mostly national staff. The unit 
is available to projects / programs seeking M&E advice, but is not 
mandated to coordinate and guide the projects / programs in 
establishing their M&E systems, nor even in reviewing them once 
they have been established. This is different from the mandates 
of M&E Units of other development actors in Afghanistan like 
DfID or the World Bank.
Key informants assessed the quality and usefulness of GIZ and 
KfW M&E systems in Afghanistan quite differently. While one 
group said that the M&E systems are providing the necessary 
data for project management and decision-making, others 
expressed concerns that M&E was not taken seriously enough 
within GDC in Afghanistan.93 The latter noted a low level of expe-
rience of some of the individuals working on M&E and expressed 
concerns that greater M&E expertise would be needed in order 
to build stronger systems.94 Afghanistan experts, outside but 
familiar with GDC, noted that the data gathered could be further 
standardized and at the same time provided in more detail. For 
example, documenting geographical coordinates to show the 
exact location of activities would greatly assist evaluations.95 
89  JGB Gauff Ingenieure (2012).
90  Additional guidelines for designing and using a RBM system were published by GIZ in 2013, GIZ (2013c).
91  Interviews October 14, November 3, November 4, November 5, November 6, and November 8, 2013.
92  Interviews October 14 and November 3, 2013.
93  For example, Interview October 14, 2013.
94  Interviews October 3 and October 14, 2013.
95  Interview October 3, 2013.
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More standardized data collection was also seen as necessary 
groundwork which could enable more strategic evaluations.96 
More coherence among the monitoring systems across the 
different implementing actors would augment the comparability 
and validity of monitoring data and thus enhance its use among 
projects as well as beyond the project level.
The BMZ addresses these concerns by setting overarching goals 
at the country level in its new country strategy 2014 – 2017. 
The overarching goals enabled the selection of objectives and 
quantified indicators stated in the country strategy for all priority 
sectors.97 The BMZ Division for Afghanistan / Pakistan explained 
that efforts will be made to align project / program indicators to 
the new country and sector indicators and objectives. Such a 
systematic deduction of objectives and indicators would ensure 
greater coherence for the collection of monitoring data, which 
would lead to better data comparability. Most importantly, the 
intervention logic between the country, sector and project levels 
would be made more explicit and the ground would be set for 
adopting a stronger impact orientation in the future.
The Tracking System of German Development Assistance
The continuous need for output data and up-to-date reporting 
in Germany led to the adoption of an online database to track 
progress in Afghanistan in 2010. The tracking system was set up 
when the German development offensive was getting started 
in Northern Afghanistan. It focused on collecting (quick) results 
gained for the population through the infrastructure (re-) 
construction and capacity development projects and programs.98 
The tracking system acts as a repository for project and program 
information across all five German ministries providing funding 
for development assistance and monitors the implementation 
status of projects and programs and their outputs.99
The database is fed with information from all agencies and their 
partners receiving funding from the German government. There 
are about 40 different organizations operating in Afghanistan 
which are regularly contributing to the database. This monitoring 
system tracks basic financial and activity data of projects at the 
input and output level. The GIZ office in Kabul hosts an M&E unit, 
which operates the tracking system. Financed by the BMZ, this 
M&E unit processes and analyses the data. It also generates data 
for the half-yearly Afghanistan Progress Report to the German 
Bundestag.100 This report is prepared by all five federal ministries 
under the editorial direction of the Federal Foreign Office and 
published by the Federal Government of Germany. Its main 
intention is to provide a mutually agreed situational analysis to 
inform the Bundestag on a regular basis. The tracking system is 
also seen as providing the means for answering ad hoc requests 
for information from the Bundestag, the German embassy in 
Kabul, and other stakeholders.101
Several individuals interviewed for this review noted that the 
complicated interface of the tracking system is an impediment to 
data recording and its wider usage. Only a few individuals are fa-
miliar enough with the system to be able to quickly obtain results 
to queries. Further, capturing outputs of infrastructure projects 
is a lot easier than for capacity development projects, which has 
raised concern among GIZ staff on whether their achievements 
are adequately captured in the database.102 This issue was noted 
by a number of interviewees, both inside and outside of GDC, 
and remains a major challenge for the advancement of the track-
ing system. Zürcher et al. (2013) advocate reforming the tracking 
system and state that the data in its present form, although 
being collected with considerable effort, is neither useable for 
steering the portfolio, nor for conducting impact assessments.103 
The BMZ responded to these concerns and has commissioned 
work to provide suggestions to improve the system.
96  Interview October 3, 2013.
97  BMZ (2014a: 18 – 36).
98  Interview November 5, 2013; Internal Document # 5.
99  Internal Document # 4.
100  GIZ (2013d: 16), E-Mail correspondence with BMZ, 28.10.2013; Bundesregierung (2012).
101  Interviews October 3, November 5, and November 8, 2013.
102  Interviews October 24, November 5, and November 10, 2013.
103  Zürcher et al. (2013: 19).
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In conclusion, the tracking system is viewed as a positive effort 
by those involved in GDC. Its greatest benefit is that it helps to 
amalgamate development data from all German funders into 
one database. The tracking system and the Risk Management 
Office (see next section) provide examples that cooperation 
and concerted action among all German development actors 
in Afghanistan are feasible, despite political and institutional 
barriers.
Peace and Conflict Assessments
Taking a conflict-sensitive approach is formally required by BMZ 
in all GDC operations. In the first instance this means to “do no 
harm” by either intentionally or unintentionally aggravating the 
situation. However, a conflict- and peace-sensitive approach goes 
beyond this notion and actively seeks opportunities to foster 
peace and reduce conflict. Thus, all GDC funded projects and 
programs are expected to identify peace building measures at 
the project or program level where possible. Continuous in-depth 
analysis of the conflict situation and flexible adjustments during 
project implementation are requirements for incorporating a 
conflict-sensitive approach into operations.104
In collaboration with the German Institute of Global and Area 
Studies (GIGA) the BMZ annually assesses the conflict and 
violence situation in all countries in which BMZ operates. 
Afghanistan is judged one of the most challenging environments 
for development cooperation. In response, AA and BMZ estab-
lished a Risk Management Office (RMO), which they jointly and 
directly fund, instead of providing funding through projects, as is 
common in other countries. The RMO is responsible for manag-
ing risks to GDC personnel and projects during implementation. 
To this end, it conducts continuous context and risk analyses, 
passes the information on to all GDC actors in the field, issues 
alerts, holds regular meetings and provides guidelines to staff 
and projects.105
BMZ requires that in countries classified as critical for conflict 
threat, a conflict analysis 106 be carried out and results integrated 
into project planning and M&E systems. In Afghanistan, advising 
GDC projects and programs is the task of the Peace and Conflict 
Assessment (PCA) Unit, which is hosted in the RMO. To ensure 
alignment of analytical approaches and assessments across 
projects, a PCA focal point is nominated for each project and 
acts as a liaison person to the PCA Unit in Kabul. Efforts to better 
integrate the PCA within the M&E unit of projects are currently 
being discussed.
In addition to these regular activities, four conflict analyses at 
the country level have been produced in Afghanistan by GDC 
since 2002. The first study was released in 2003, which was 
described as being similar to a post-conflict needs assessment. 
Such an assessment instrument is used in the UN system to 
identify and budget for development needs in such situations, 
based on an in-depth conflict analysis.107 In 2006 and 2010 two 
more assessments were done. These studies informed GDC 
framework documents at the country level, sector strategies 
and finally led to the integration of conflict-sensitive measures 
in project / program plans, including the M&E plans.108 In spring 
2013 a report on peace building needs and their integration into 
the GDC portfolio was released. This study informed the BMZ 
country strategy for Afghanistan.
Overall, interviewees reviewed the efforts undertaken by GDC 
to assure conflict sensitivity in its strategies and operations as 
high, valid and helpful. GIZ staff mentioned that much trial and 
error has taken place, and that it took time to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the context in order to address conflict 
sensitivity effectively at the project level. It was also mentioned 
in this context that GDC’s strong focus on conflict and peace 
enables GIZ to maintain its presence and acceptance in Afghan 
communities, a requirement for participatory project designs. 
104  For further details see BMZ (2013b).
105  Interview October 24 and October 29, 2013.
106  A conflict analysis describes the phenomena of conflict, violence and fragility and their interdependence in a specific country context. It analyses root causes of the phenomena and describes their actual 
dynamics. It identifies conflict drivers; analyses power relations, institutional capacities and resource endowments. It further reviews relevant national policies and donor strategies in order to assess the 
inherent potential for non-violent conflict solutions. The analysis concludes with the formulation of needs for peace and security under possible scenarios (worst case / best case, most likely development 
etc.) and the identification of risks (context / institutional / political and personal) for development cooperation (GIZ 2008).
107  UNDG (2014).
108  Interview October 29, 2013.
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Interviewees stated that it is due to these efforts that they are 
able to operate in areas where they otherwise could not.109 Such 
statements are indications that the PCA approach is not just 
helpful, but also effective. Future evaluations in Afghanistan 
should analyze in more detail how far German development 
assistance has incorporated a conflict-sensitive approach in 
the design and implementation of projects. It is assumed that 
conflict sensitivity has a significant effect on the effectiveness, 
acceptance, and sustainability of German development efforts in 
Afghanistan. Providing evidence that validates this assumption 
would underpin BMZ strategic decisions and efforts to continue 
this endeavor.
Considering practical matters of future impact assessments in 
Afghanistan, the PCA unit and the RMO should play a role in 
determining which evaluation designs are feasible for being im-
plemented in Afghanistan. This holds particularly true if primary 
data collection is planned. The security situation in Afghanistan 
also demands that extra resources for safety measures be 
calculated into evaluation budgets.
3.1.3 Strategic Level Evaluative Work
Evaluations with a more strategic or aggregated focus, such as 
sector or (country) portfolio evaluations, exist to a much lesser 
extent and have mainly been conducted by other international 
donor agencies. Attempts were made by the BMZ to enhance 
the level of strategic evaluations, making overtures during the 
16th and 17th legislative periods to conduct an evaluation of 
the entire German ODA contribution to Afghanistan; however, 
BMZ was unable to garner support for such an effort from the 
other involved federal ministries so that the proposal has not 
been forwarded.110 This fact has been criticized by external 
observers, who have been blunt in noting that no systematic 
evaluation of Germany’s entire engagement in Afghanistan has 
taken place 111, while at the same time “[the] political reports 
from the government remain general, euphemistic, and shaped 
by an interest in self-justification.” 112 Several interviewees said 
that a new effort by the BMZ to rally support for conducting a 
country portfolio evaluation on German development assistance 
in Afghanistan would unlikely succeed in the near future. Only a 
strong political initiative at the level of the German parliament 
could overcome the existing resistance in some quarters.113
In an important gap-filling exercise the BMZ catered for the 
lack of evidence at strategic levels by submitting its own part 
of the German aid portfolio to a twofold assessment. In doing 
so the BMZ commissioned two pieces of overarching work that 
clearly stand out: an innovative longitudinal impact assessment 
conducted by a research team at the Freie Universität Berlin 
(Zürcher et al. 2007a, 2010) and a Strategic Portfolio Review 
undertaken by a group of researchers working with Prof. Zürcher, 
now at the University of Ottawa (Zürcher et al. 2013).
The Impact Assessment of Development Cooperation in 
North East Afghanistan 
This multi-year research project has been conducted with 
funding from the German Research Foundation (DFG) and in 
cooperation with the BMZ’s Evaluation Division (BMZ-E), which 
has published results of this work as BMZ evaluation reports. It 
is notable that, due to efforts on the part of BMZ-E, a connection 
between the original scope of the research and German devel-
opment efforts has been established (e.g. via the expansion of 
researched districts to include more areas of GDC and through 
publications specifically for the BMZ). Conducted by Zürcher, 
Koehler, and Böhnke, the project began in 2007 and continues 
into the present.114 It focuses on the question of whether 
development cooperation at large (“aid”) has had an impact on 
the stabilization of a conflict zone by changing general attitudes 
towards the peace building mission, the legitimacy of the Afghan 
state, and perceived security threats.115
109  Interview October 29, 2013.
110  E-mail correspondence with BMZ, November 5, 2013.
111  This was mentioned in interviews for this review and by some authors, including Nachtwei (2011).
112  Nachtwei (2011).
113  Interviews October 1, October 3, and October 24, 2013.
114  The research team has produced multiple reports, including a pre-study (Zürcher et al. 2007c), an approach and methods paper (Zürcher et al. 2007b), an interim report (Zürcher et al. 2007a), and a final 
report for 2005 – 2009 (Zürcher et al. 2010). It is expected that another report for the phase 2011 – 2013 will be published in the near future.
115  Zürcher et al. (2010: 6); Zürcher et al (2007a).
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The research follows best practice standards for impact evalua-
tion in its adopted methodology. Next to incorporating a robust 
multi-method approach, including quantitative and qualitative 
data collection, it adopted a longitudinal research design. So 
far, four large-sized surveys including a baseline survey have 
been conducted with local research organizations. This allows 
obtaining comparable information at the household level over 
several time periods.116 Shifts in perceptions, attitudes, and 
experiences of the Afghan population within six districts have 
been documented.117 Additionally, community profiles, quarterly 
reports from 40 village representatives, in-depth case studies at 
the village level, stakeholder interviews, and existing databases 
were used in order to capture impact.
The final report published in 2010 has twelve main findings.118 
One of the central messages is that aid positively influences 
attitudes towards the peace building mission, but only in a 
secure environment.119 This conclusion supports the networked 
security approach adopted by the German Government. Another 
finding with significant value for GDC refers to the effect of aid 
on attitudes. The effect was found to be short-lived and non-cu-
mulative, indicating that fostering positive attitudes towards 
peace building missions and development aid would have to be a 
continuous process. Such findings provide important insights on 
development work in Afghanistan which have not been captured 
by the alternative evaluative efforts.
The research results have been put to use for strategic decision 
making in GDC. For example, members of the research team 
have indicated that in ministerial discussions on the post-2014 
country strategy, the BMZ carefully considered the implications 
of the finding that aid efforts have a positive impact on attitudes 
towards the peace building mission in secure locations. The 
research team suggested to BMZ to develop a stronger informa-
tion and communication strategy in order to increase under-
standing among all projects / programs stakeholders, which has 
apparently been addressed in the new country strategy.120 GIZ 
staff pointed out that the results of the study validated the cho-
sen risk management approach in Afghanistan, which is based 
on strengthening acceptance by the local communities.121 This 
backed the BMZ decision to enhance the geographical scope and 
outreach of the risk management system, which has up through 
today allowed GIZ to directly deliver services at the district and 
village levels. Further, the result that aid has a small but positive 
impact on how the Afghan provincial and district government 
is perceived provided some confirmation of the governance 
program (i.e. the Regional Capacity Development Fund) and led 
to enhance efforts via outreach activities. Additionally, KfW staff 
indicated that they used the findings to underpin their decisions 
regarding the kind of work they would take on in Afghanistan 
programs. The positive research findings were also taken up by 
German politicians, though often in an overly affirmative manner, 
which unfortunately risks overstating the message.122
The impact assessment focuses on people’s perceptions of aid 
and security and actually does analyze the direct or indirect 
socio-economic impact of German assistance. However, the 
research does not cover all districts in which GDC operates, 
nor central level interventions, nor does it make a distinction 
between German supported efforts and those provided by 
other development actors in the North East, though Germany is 
admittedly the most important donor in that area. Hence, even 
this substantial work cannot be taken as an impact evaluation of 
GDC as a whole in Afghanistan. Further expansion of this project 
and the inclusion of a representative sample of GDC intervention 
districts would make results even more informative.
116  The survey was conducted in 77 villages in 2009, 79 villages in 2010, and 120 villages in 2011. Half of the villages were selected by random sample and half were chosen according to their diversity, based on 
five criteria. Households within the villages were randomly sampled. The surveys were conducted by an Afghan research organization.
117  The surveys conducted in 2007 and 2009 only covered four districts, with two additional districts added in 2011.
118  1. Development aid continues to reach communities, 2. The Afghan state is seen as contributing to the provisions of basic goods, 3. Development actors are met with more caution, 4. Foreign forces are met 
with more caution, 5. Threat perceptions are dramatically on the rise, 6. Households and communities still remain safe, 7. Aid positively influences attitudes towards the peace building mission, 8. … but only 
in a secure environment, 9. Aid has a small and positive impact on how the Afghan provincial and district government is perceived, 10. The positive effect of aid on attitudes and legitimacy of the Afghan 
state is short-lived and non-cumulative, 11. Aid has no impact on how foreign forces are perceived, and 12. Aid has no effect on threat perceptions.
119  Zürcher et al. (2010: 5).
120  BMZ (2014a: 35).
121  Interviews August 28 and October 3, 2013.
122  Interview October 3, 2013.
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Despite the limitations mentioned, this study provides evidence 
that methodologically demanding impact analyses, which also 
include several rounds of comprehensive household surveys, are 
possible to carry out, even over several years in fragile states like 
Afghanistan. German development cooperation would be well 
served by conducting more strategic evaluations of this kind. This 
impact analysis appears exemplary for the generation of strategic 
evidence in fragile states – particularly in combination with the 
strategic portfolio review discussed below.
The Strategic Portfolio Review 
To address existing information gaps with regard to the entire 
GDC portfolio, the BMZ Evaluation Division, in accordance with 
the BMZ Division for Afghanistan and Pakistan, commissioned a 
strategic portfolio review in 2012. The review analyzed whether 
and how adjustments to the portfolio would be helpful for a 
post-2013 engagement of BMZ in Afghanistan, and was asked 
to answer a number of specific questions on the adequacy of 
multi-donor trust funds, approaches to further involve women, 
and the engagement in rural areas – all under the specific 
consideration of a changing security context.
This strategic portfolio review provides an overview of the differ-
ent types of projects / programs implemented by GDC since 2007; 
it outlines the development of the portfolio over time, offers a 
scenario analysis, assesses the shock resistance of programs to 
security threats, and presents 15 recommendations for adjusting 
the portfolio.123 Although this work is strictly speaking not a 
proper evaluation either, and the authors do not at all claim this, 
it provides a sound analysis of the issues raised. Zürcher et al. 
(2013) state that a strategic portfolio review cannot substitute 
for the lack of evidence. Indeed, a number of politically relevant 
conclusions, particularly with regard to the most precarious pro-
grams in terms of impact and overarching political objectives, are 
made without empirical corroboration attached, although DEval 
does not doubt that the investigations were actually conducted. 
Despite the limitations, BMZ considers the strategic portfolio 
review an essential piece of analysis for shaping the new BMZ 
country strategy for Afghanistan 2014 – 2017.
Strategic Level Evaluative Works by other Development 
Partners
International assistance to Afghanistan comes from over 50 
development partners, and the overall amount of aid spent 
between 2002 and 2011 exceeded 57 billion USD. The assistance 
from most of the development partners has been evaluated (by 
internal evaluation units or by external agencies tasked to assess 
aid effectiveness of the support provided.) In 2012 the Asian 
Development Bank, Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA), Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(NORAD), and the World Bank released their strategic level 
evaluations, which usually review entire country programs. 
At least another five development partners have undertaken 
program evaluations over the past five years, including Finland, 
UNDP, UK, US and Canada. The UK has even commissioned two 
evaluations; the first one in 2009 and a second one in 2012 which 
were conducted by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact 
(ICAI). Additionally, the Government of Afghanistan issued a 
study on aid assistance with a special focus on the implementa-
tion of the Paris Declaration in 2010.124
The results and findings of these evaluations offer valuable 
lessons to development partners and to the Afghan government. 
The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank com-
missioned a comparative analysis synthesizing the core messages 
and recommendations from these evaluations and presented 
them for discussion to donors and the Afghan government at 
a workshop in Wilton Park (Great Britain, February 2013). The 
core findings of the synthesis paper and the workshop report are 
summarized in the following block.125
123  Zürcher et al. (2013: iii-iv; 4 – 5).
124  The evaluation reports mentioned are listed in the list of references.
125  The following summary is fully based on Sud (2013) and G. J. Wilson (2013), who presented a synthesis paper and the conference report of the Wilton Park conference in February 2013.
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What are evaluation results telling us about the effective-
ness of aid in Afghanistan? (based on results of the Wilton 
Park Conference 2013)
Nine development partners evaluated the aid effectiveness of 
their country programs in Afghanistan between 2007 – 2012. 
The following results were drawn as lessons learned:
 • There have been significant accomplishments in delivering 
goods and services to the Afghan people. The output indica-
tors in virtually every sector have improved dramatically (e.g. 
there are 1,500 more health clinics operable in 2011 compared 
to 2002; the number of teachers increased from 64,000 to 
170,000 in nine years; the number of school buildings more 
than doubled in this time period; 30 % of the total road 
network has been rehabilitated).
 • Major impediments to aid effectiveness are the high costs of 
operations in this fragile state context due to high admin-
istration costs, low administrative capacities, additional 
security costs and recurring implementation delays. These 
factors particularly lower efficiency rates.
 • The sustainability of projects has been rated as low by most 
development partners and remains a serious issue of concern, 
since the public finances were assessed as being seriously 
inadequate to sustain the costs of current programs funded 
by aid.
 • While all donor evaluations consider their respective activities 
to have been (highly) relevant and well aligned with GIRoA 
plans and priorities, the government itself contrarily consid-
ers that many donors show little commitment to aligning 
contributions to national plans and priorities. Particularly 
troublesome is the parallel existence of different models 
of sub-national governance, introduced by different donor 
agencies with no clear decision from the Afghan government 
which one will be taken on as the national model.
 • The most significant results of aid are seen by the establish-
ment and functioning of a basic civil service, the implemen-
tation of a banking and public financial management system, 
the achieved legitimacy of the state via a series of elections 
with high participation, and the slow but steady progress in 
gender equity.
 • Aid has been less effective in fostering confidence of the 
Afghan people in the judiciary and political system, conquer-
ing corruption, and achieving sustainable economic growth 
(particularly regarding jobs and in reforming the agricultural 
sector). 
 • Evaluations have also shown that, despite extensive efforts to 
build the capacity of civil servants, they are disappointingly 
far from reaching anticipated results. The weak outcomes 
in developing the capacity of state employees are fueled by 
the fact that neither the donors nor the government have a 
comprehensive view on building state capacity.
 • With regards to achieving outcomes for subnational govern-
ance, the evaluations generally conclude that there has not 
been much progress on building governance at the local level. 
Donor’s efforts are uncoordinated and lack a coherent view 
of local governance – which can also be seen even within the 
Afghan government.
Conclusions: 
 • There is need for a much sharper focus on just a few over-
arching issues rather than on a large and scattered donor 
effort.
 • Better alignment and priority setting among donors could 
enhance aid effectiveness.
 • The Afghan government will have to demonstrate stronger 
leadership and commitment.
 • More attention should to be given to how aid can be more 
sustainable in the future, particular in the context of 
potential declining development aid budgets.
 • More attention to results is an uncontested demand by all 
parties; however, differences remain between the Afghan 
government and donors on how this can be achieved. For 
the Afghan government this means more aid “on budget”, 
better alignment of aid to the country’s priorities, and better 
division of labor amongst donors. On the other hand, donors 
point to the increased level of accountability for money 
spent in Afghanistan and find it is not always easy to be sure 
that progress is being made, especially on key issues such 
as corruption and justice. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability 
Framework (TMAF) provides a frame in which mutual 
accountability can be addressed.
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 • Understanding effects of aid in Afghanistan is seriously 
hampered by a lack of focus within existing M&E systems on 
outcomes and the continued lack of good quality analytical 
work, upon which robust evaluations can be built.
 • In the highly politicized environment the perception of what 
success looks like often differs substantially among donors 
and the Afghan government. It needs to be acknowledged 
that in Afghanistan external issues drive the debate just as 
much as internal issues.126
Source: based on G. J. Wilson (2013) and Sud (2013)
Most of the evaluations confirm a lack of focus of the M&E 
systems on outcomes, which significantly weakens the analysis of 
downstream socio-economic effects of aid. This result mirrors the 
constraints identified for evaluative work in German cooperation 
(see chapter 3.1.1 and 3.1.2). Nevertheless, three common themes 
are addressed by most donor programs with some consideration 
of outcomes: State building, citizenship and legitimacy, as well 
as economic growth and jobs. These themes are also given 
priority by GDC, as reflected in the selection of their five priority 
sectors. In conclusion Wilson (2013) and Sud (2013) suggest much 
closer cooperation between donors and the Afghan government 
in undertaking evaluations in the future, which could help to 
narrow the gap between the various political viewpoints.
3.2
Summary of Findings from the Evaluative Work 
Conducted Under the BMZ Portfolio 
The review of evaluative material produced by GDC in Afghani-
stan illustrates that KfW’s ex-post evaluations and GIZ’s project 
progress reviews are building the backbone of results control 
at the project level. The review of the reports shows a strong 
project / program orientation with a focus on immediate achieve-
ments (outputs) rather than effects. However, over time most 
bi- and multilateral development agencies operating in Afghan-
istan have complemented their project level evaluations with 
more strategic evaluations (e.g. sector or country level evalua-
tions). A country level evaluation has not yet been conducted by 
Germany on its portfolio.127 To this day, the longitudinal impact 
assessment on North East Afghanistan and the strategic portfolio 
review are the most substantial pieces of strategic evaluative 
work available in the German context. One reason why so few 
strategic level evaluations have taken place until now is the weak 
coordination among the five German federal ministries providing 
funds to projects in Afghanistan. While a tracking system has 
been operational since 2010 and has captured project data at the 
input and output level for all German funded operations, this 
kind of coordination is rather the exception than the rule. For 
example, the AA project portfolio has not been included in the 
strategic portfolio review commissioned by BMZ, although the 
AA provides over two-fifths of German funding for development 
cooperation in Afghanistan. As a consequence, it does not take 
the support to building the police force into consideration – 
which is the largest sector by value for the GIZ (see Figure 6), 
nor major contributions to the health and air traffic sectors, 
nor several projects in the governance sector, all of which are 
AA-funded. This raises questions regarding the reasons for this 
sectoral division of labor, not just those regarding their effects. 
The availability of project monitoring data as one information 
source for strategic evaluations is incomplete. Baseline data were 
often missing, and very diverse in their quality. Again, better 
alignment of monitoring systems among the different actors, as 
well as more standardized data collection were deemed neces-
sary if more strategic level evaluations are to take place.128
The fact that cooperation in Afghanistan stood constantly in the 
political limelight back in Germany has played an important role 
on how business has been done with regard to M&E systems 
and evaluative work. These conditions favored a set of products 
which serve a different purpose than the regular modus operandi 
126  More specifically, G. J. Wilson state “in a heavily politicized environment there remain key differences in the perception of the GIRoA and of the donors in terms of what success looks like. These differences 
steer the discussion in many directions other than just development. The debate concerning aid effectiveness, donor coordination and aid modalities cannot be divorced from external issues such as 
the domestic political climate in donor capitals, the military campaign and upcoming withdrawal, financial crises in the west and worsening fiscal constraints, and anti-corruption issues. The relative 
importance of these aspects changes over time, but they drive the debate” (G. J. Wilson 2013: 1).
127  Interviews October 1 and October 3, 2013.
128  Zürcher et al. are even more explicit on this point and state „without a useful database for monitoring one’s own work, neither steering nor impact control in possible“ (Zürcher et al. 2013: 19).
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in other partner countries.129 According to several interview 
sources, continuous demand for quick results from the German 
parliament, the funding ministries, and the media led to a 
pressured environment where the need for quantitative input 
and output level data for demonstrating progress took prece-
dence.130 Project level information was often used to support 
decisions from a German foreign or defense policy perspective, 
rather than using it to generate evidence for what works on the 
ground and what does not. Interview partners remarked that 
reports on GDC in Afghanistan focus on sucesses and do not 
provide the political space to discuss failures in comparison to 
other partner countries. Thus, the produced evaluative work has 
focused on proving the worth of efforts to an external audience, 
while internal learning has remained at the operational instead of 
the strategic level.131 The project ratings of the reviewed reports 
provide indicative evidence to this argument: none of the 11 
projects received the rating “less successful” or “unsuccessful” by 
the evaluators. Seven projects have been rated “mostly success-
ful”, two as “very successful”, one as successful and one report 
abstained from presenting ratings.
Insecurity widely influenced the evaluation approaches selected 
and the usefulness of certain types of evaluations. Operating in a 
fragile country has impeded the gathering of robust and ground-
ed data from the field since evaluators are often hindered in 
conducting larger household surveys or other fieldwork. Howev-
er, some evaluators and researchers have found ways of dealing 
with this situation, such as working closely with local research 
and surveying institutes. The knowledge of the PCA Unit and 
the RMO in Kabul on the conflict situation in the country and 
on conflict sensitive project designs should be put to use when 
designing evaluations in the future. 
Political and social fragility has also impacted the usefulness of 
certain types of evaluations. While ex-post evaluations often 
provide very valuable information for long-term learning on good 
project designs, their utilization in Afghanistan is impeded by 
the highly volatile environment. Circumstances change fast and 
so profoundly that findings of ex-post evaluations might not be 
adequate or relevant anymore to the present, providing less val-
ue for guiding decisions than in a stable setting. Complementing 
ex-post evaluations with more robust end-of-project (or -phase) 
evaluations is therefore recommended.
The set-up of the German M&E system is a final reason for the 
limited support to strategic decision-making. The system has 
a strong focus on internal, project-level monitoring (e.g. the 
tracking system) and evaluation (mandatory PPRs and ex-post 
evaluations). Further, the M&E Unit in Kabul does not have the 
mandate to exercise an oversight function for aligning different 
elements of evaluative work and supervising its quality. Given 
that the M&E system is also not oriented towards specific 
objectives above the project level, the existing work is impeded 
in taking a more strategic direction, which seriously limits the 
informative value of the analyses for strategic planning and 
decision-making at the sector and country level. Due to the 
division of labor within the German aid system, this affects BMZ 
potentially more than the implementing agencies. 
Based on key informant interviews, this review is able to provide 
some anecdotal information on how results of evaluative work 
have guided German development work in Afghanistan. Howev-
er, obtaining a more in-depth understanding of the utilization of 
evaluative work in GDC requires extensive research beyond the 
scope of this review. For example, tracing studies could provide 
valuable insights on how, when and why recommendations of 
evaluations have informed decision making.
Key informants interviewed in BMZ, GIZ, and KfW made it clear 
that they have actually used the evaluative material provided. 
The BMZ asserts that the tracking system, the strategic portfolio 
review, and the impact assessment in North East Afghanistan 
were used to analytically underpin the new BMZ country strategy 
for Afghanistan.132 Project level evaluative work is said to have 
129  Interview November 1, 2013.
130  Interviews October 9, October 24, and November 3, 2013.
131  Interviews October 24, October 29, November 3, 2013; comment received to draft version of this report 18.12.2013.
132  Internal Document #1.
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continuously informed the steering of the project portfolio and 
the priority areas. Some examples of this are: (a) the decision to 
discontinue complex infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, (b) 
the revision of the value chain approach in sustainable economic 
development projects, and (c) BMZ’s request to KfW to accel-
erate the approval procedures within the RIDF.133 GIZ and KfW 
in Afghanistan use evaluative works for decisions all along the 
project cycle, including the design of new projects and project 
phases. However, as mentioned by one consultant, certain 
recommendations could not always be adopted by the projects, 
for political reasons.134
133  Written comment by BMZ to earlier draft of this report, December 19, 2013.
134  Interview October 14, 2013.
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4.1
Conclusions
Relating findings to the questions raised at the beginning of 
this review with regard to the volume, quality and usage of 
evaluation within the GDC in Afghanistan, it can be concluded 
that a substantial body of output-related evaluative work exists 
in relatively good quality for the GDC portfolio.
Nonetheless, the evaluations available today at the program and 
project level are of limited informative value for underpinning 
strategic decisions at the ministerial level with evidence. This 
judgment can be verified by looking at the range of questions the 
BMZ directed at the team that conducted the strategic portfolio 
review (as presented in chapter 3.1). The questions show that 
critical information for steering the right mix of the portfolio and 
for developing a country strategy was not readily available.
There are no sector level evaluations available providing insights 
on the effectiveness of work within the sector, or for guiding 
decisions on whether GDC is operating in the right sectors, 
whether the mix of sectors and the allocation of funds among 
them is the best possible option. An evaluation of the govern-
ance funds (RCDF, RIDF and OPAF) has not been commissioned 
so far, although such a report could help answering the question 
about the effects of BMZ and AA engagement in rural areas on 
sub-national governance. However, the ARTF has been internally 
and externally evaluated several times by others, which has 
provided robust evidence that it is a successful tool.135 And still, 
issues about the absorption capacity of the Afghan government 
remain to be analyzed in order to decide if and to which extent 
the ARTF can be scaled-up.136
The context for German cooperation in Afghanistan is expected 
to change after 2014 with the withdrawal of ISAF troops. It is 
anticipated that there will be less political pressure for quick 
results. As reflected at the Wilton Park conference, this will quite 
possibly shift the attention of decision-makers and technical 
staff in international development organizations towards gaining 
better insights in processes and longer term results. It is further 
anticipated that there will be more space for learning from fail-
ures and expressing challenges and risks more clearly. It can be 
further expected that a new realism regarding achievements of 
project or program objectives in terms of scope and time will set 
in. All these anticipated changes are likely to provide a window of 
opportunity to extend and adjust evaluative work in Afghanistan.
4.2
Recommendations 
The core recommendation is to address the fragmentation and 
incoherence of the present M&E system and to work towards 
an integrative evaluation approach in Afghanistan. Integrative 
means aligning internal project-focused evaluative work with 
independent evaluations which focus on effects at the program, 
sector, instrument or country level. A systematically deduced 
evaluation program would require more standardized data 
collection and analysis to enhance comparability among units. 
This requirement might entail more professional evaluative 
capacity on the ground. In order to facilitate the shift towards an 
integrative approach, the mandate of the already existing M&E 
unit should be expanded to supervise the set-up of M&E systems 
for German funded projects and to generate sector and country 
level monitoring data.137
Other donor agencies have adopted different approaches for 
setting up their M&E systems in Afghanistan. A comparison of 
the strengths and weaknesses of these systems can provide 
information for reforming the German M&E system. Ideas of how 
to proceed can be found by looking at the M&E set-up of DfID’s 
Girls Education Challenge Fund, where an external evaluation 
consultancy has been hired to act as a professional M&E advisor 
to project / programs over the life time of the project. The 
external M&E specialists are helping to integrate M&E from the 
135  G. J. Wilson (2013: 3); Sud (2013: 17).
136  Zürcher et al. (2013: 22 – 23).
137  The ideas for strengthening internal and external evaluation efforts presented in the following are founded on responses given during key informant interviews. One set of questions asked in all interviews 
referred to demands and suggestions for a future evaluation plan for GDC in Afghanistan.
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beginning of a project and ensuring high standards. The Helmand 
Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (HMEP) and the ARTF are 
good examples for combining internal and external evaluations 
to achieve robust evidence on effects of interventions.138
4.2.1 Ideas for Strengthening Internal Evaluation
A stronger orientation towards measuring effects in evaluations 
will provide valuable evidence for operational and strategic 
decision-making. In recommending that the targets and indica-
tors retained in the new BMZ country strategy be the reference 
for aligning program and project level targets and indicators, this 
review takes up what is apparently intended by BMZ to be done 
since the strategy’s launch in March 2014.
In support of this, it is recommended to orient the existing M&E 
system stronger towards assessing project and sector level 
outcomes and impacts. A shift towards systematically assessing 
effects of interventions would be in alignment with the already 
existing guidelines and standards for M&E systems by BMZ, GIZ 
and KfW. 
It is recommended that more resources and attention be given 
toward establishing baselines (at project and sector level). They 
are an important requirement for applying the robust designs 
of impact analysis, and can include the building of ex-ante or 
ex-post control groups. 
It is recommended that the objective of the tracking system 
be extended, so that monitoring data is also being collected 
systematically at the country and sector level. The M&E Unit 
managing the tracking system should obtain more resources to 
conduct broader data analysis with attention given to analyzing 
information obtained at different levels.139
Standardizing indicators at the project level to some degree 
would allow for better data comparability among projects and 
between sectors. 
Even at the project level the right kind of evaluations can 
enhance the informative value for decision-making at different 
levels. KfW should consider complementing ex-post evaluations 
with robust end-of-project evaluations in order to reduce the 
risk of not presenting timely results in a fast-changing country 
context. Additionally evaluations of projects that have been iden-
tified as needing adaptations by the strategic portfolio review 
(i.e. TVET, the national road project from Kunduz to Khulm) could 
be timely and strategic.140
Future evaluative work should build on an existing analytical 
experience with peace building and conflict-sensitive interven-
tions. Reviewing this would provide important insights to GDC’s 
approach in fragile states and would strengthen the German 
position among international donors in fragile state settings.141
Building knowledge among GDC staff on what works, why, 
and under what circumstances in Afghanistan should also be 
approached more systematically. Key results of analyses and 
evaluations could be disseminated to the entire country program 
staff for discussion – to those at the headquarters in Germany, 
as well as in the field, along with Afghan partners, particularly 
in a country where the turnover of staff is as high as it is in 
Afghanistan.142
Altogether, building an evaluation culture within the German 
organizations working in Afghanistan should be pursued as the 
best way for institutional learning, as not only success, but also 
failures would be addressed. If deemed necessary, communica-
tion strategies would also be adjusted accordingly.
138  The Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (HMEP) is a comprehensive provincial level M&E system for all UK works in Helmand Province. Started in 2009, HMEP’s focus was on the wider 
impact of UK projects and programs on attitudinal shifts. The HMEP also serves to centralize and standardize the information available about UK development cooperation, as multiple actors were 
utilizing different methodological approaches, leading to different perspectives on what should be evaluated.
139  Reform of the tracking system is also recommended by Zürcher et al. (2013: 19) and its use retained in the new BMZ country strategy for Afghanistan (BMZ 2014a: 22).
140  Zürcher et al. (2013: 24 – 25).
141  Interview October 29, 2013. Drawing on their assessment, Zürcher et al. (2013: 20) make the point that, although GDC has no leverage on influencing the overall security situation in Afghanistan, the 
conflict-sensitive project implementation of GDC can quite well have a preventive effect and contribute to stabilizing peace. They recommend that bottom up peace building should be strengthened, 
particularly in rural development.
142  Interviews November 8 and November 10, 2013. See also Zürcher et al. (2013: 19).
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4.2.2 Ideas for External and Independent Evaluation
The second prong to an approach for future evaluative works 
in Afghanistan would be more external and independent 
evaluations. Three types of evaluations and two themes are 
recommended to conduct in the near future:
1. Ultimately, a comprehensive evaluation of all aid interventions 
of the German Government in Afghanistan remains desirable. 
It would provide the most comprehensive assessment of 
achieved results and would contribute to the on-going 
international discussion on evaluation lessons drawn from 
development assistance to Afghanistan. Furthermore, a 
comprehensive country evaluation could delve into the 
appropriate sequencing of interventions directed by different 
German ministries, under the general headings of governance, 
social and economic development and security. A country 
program evaluation could also review the results and conse-
quences of applying different approaches to development by 
different entities (e.g. hand-outs vs. self-help). Admittedly, 
such a country evaluation runs at present into the difficulties 
stemming from gaps in impact measurement at the project 
level. However, the strategic evaluations of several other 
donors have shown that principally it is feasible to accomplish 
such evaluations. The evaluation can examine the coherence 
of target systems, interventions logics, comparative impact 
assessment of instruments and approaches, and selective field 
research on particularly relevant or critical interventions. The 
results of such an evaluation can still provide decisive insight 
on how the alignment of objectives, strategies and approaches 
among German ministries can be improved.143
2. Should a comprehensive country evaluation remain nonnego-
tiable among the German ministries, the German government 
should provide good reasons for abstaining, given the mass 
of insight already produced by the strategic studies commis-
sioned by the BMZ. In DEval’s assessment, the alternative is 
not a country evaluation focusing on the BMZ portfolio alone, 
as essential information beyond the aforementioned studies 
will accrue only in a couple of years. Yet, BMZ should not 
abstain from commissioning strategic sector- or instrument- 
evaluations to support its steering function. Sector evalu-
ations that are initially confined to BMZ-directed work can 
provide valuable information in particular where the need for 
adaptation has already been identified (e.g. sustainable eco-
nomic development). The German Foreign Office and other 
ministries may want to follow suit and extend the examination 
to other sectors. The design of such an evaluation would allow 
for accumulating knowledge within the priority sectors on 
results over time, as well as enabling comparability in selected 
dimensions across sectors.144
3. Despite the deficits in outcome and impact measurement, a 
wealth of information exists from the work of Afghan-German 
projects which has been implemented for over a decade. To 
hoist this treasure of information for strategic planning and 
decision-making would require a set of meta-analyses which 
address pertinent cross-cutting issues based on available 
project documentation. The issues should be identified by 
BMZ together with Afghan partners and the implementing 
agencies (e.g. on a specific instrument like the regional funds). 
Such analysis can be completed by tracing how prior evalua-
tion findings have actually been used for project design and 
steering. The results of these studies would provide valuable 
inputs for developing a specific evaluation program for GDC 
in Afghanistan that has a high value of usefulness for all actors 
involved.145
Next to these different types of aggregated evaluations, two 
themes are recommended that should be further investigated 
and underpinned by evaluations.
a. It is recommended that the first piece of work looks at 
identifying ways to better capture the results of capacity 
development projects / programs. Capacity development 
operations account for up to 40 % of the BMZ portfolio. The 
concern that their achievements are not sufficiently captured 
by the present monitoring system has been expressed during 
discussions on the tracking system (see section 3.1 above). 
143  Interviews October 9 and October 21, 2013.
144  Interview October 1, 2013.
145  Interviews October 1 and October 24, 2013.
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Results of this study could help to capture the effects of a 
relatively large part of the portfolio better.146 Demand for this 
work has also been expressed by donors attending the Wilton 
Park conference. Key questions were framed as “Capacity 
development – what have we learned from the evaluations?” 
and “How can support to capacity development be improved 
and institutionalized in the government?” 147
b. The second theme to be addressed refers to evaluating gender 
mainstreaming approaches. Demand for this work has been 
expressed internationally, as well as from within GDC. Al-
though “gender equity has been a focus of all donor programs 
and shows progress” 148, there is little understanding of which 
gender approach is showing which effect. Zürcher et al. (2013) 
recommend that “an evaluation of gender mainstreaming 
projects (or the gender components of projects) should be 
conducted, in order to develop a gender strategy based on its 
results which takes into account the specific conditions found 
within Afghanistan.” 149
DEval’s future role in supporting an evaluation program in 
Afghanistan could include advising GDC country staff in Germa-
ny and Afghanistan in developing a comprehensive evaluation 
program, assisting in designing an integrative M&E system and 
conducting some of the external and independent evaluations 
outlined in this section.
Looking forward to at least four more years of GDC in Afghani-
stan means that continued efforts aiming to better understand 
the complex nature of development work in this country are 
sound investments and are being made with the ultimate 
objective of contributing to improving the well-being of the 
Afghan people.
146  Interviews October 24, November 5, and November 8, 2013. Zürcher et al. (2013: 21 – 22) make the point that the effectiveness of capacity development (CD) projects is hampered by the fact that it is often 
not a lack of capacity but political will to implement reforms. CD projects are ineffective because they are not in demand from the side of the Afghan government. The authors suggest evaluating the 
incentive structure of CD projects in detail to gain a better understanding of whether the CD approach has any chance to succeed in the specific context.
147  Wilson (2013: 5 and 6).
148  Sud (2013: 9).
149  Zürcher et al. (2013: 28), English translation by DEval.
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T
his review is based on an extensive document analysis 
and a set of key informant interviews. The objective of 
the review is to gain an understanding of the type and 
quality of evaluations that have been undertaken by 
BMZ and the two implementing agencies GIZ and KfW in Afghan-
istan in recent years. The review focuses on the time period 
between 2002 and 2013, i.e. the time frame after the fall of the 
Taliban government and the reengagement of the international 
community in development cooperation in Afghanistan in 2002.
The review appraises the following 7 research questions:
1. What is included in the GDC portfolio and how has it devel-
oped over the past decade?
2. What does the evaluation practice of GDC in Afghanistan 
currently look like? (How many and what types of evaluations 
have been conducted?) 
3. How and to what extent do the evaluations measure results 
(i.e. outputs, outcomes, and impacts)? (What can be said 
about the effectiveness of German development cooperation 
in Afghanistan? Which evaluation designs have been applied?) 
4. What is the quality of the evaluations that have been conduct-
ed? (Criteria for this assessment are outlined in Annex C)
5. How have the findings, conclusions, and recommendations 
of the evaluations been utilized? (How have the evaluations 
impacted GDC planning and strategic decision-making in 
Afghanistan?)
6. What can be learned from other development cooperation 
actors’ evaluation efforts in Afghanistan that would be 
applicable to GDC?
7. What should a future evaluation program of GDC in Afghani-
stan look like? (What kind of evaluations should be conducted, 
who should do it and how should it be done in the future?)
The review utilized both primary and secondary data collection 
techniques. 25 key informant interviews took place in addition to 
a document review. The key informant interviews were used to 
obtain GDC actors’ general views on evaluation in Afghanistan, 
to consider the quality of evaluations that have taken place, and 
to gain an understanding on how evaluations have been utilized 
within the BMZ and its implementing partner organizations for 
the purposes of planning and decision-making. 
Interviews were conducted with BMZ, GIZ, and KfW staff based 
in both Germany and Afghanistan. Additionally, academic 
researchers with extensive knowledge of Afghanistan and GDC 
have been interviewed to provide an external perspective. 
Confidentiality of information and anonymity of informants has 
been guaranteed by DEval to all key informants. Therefore, the 
list of informants is not included as an Annex in this report. 
The secondary data collection included a document review of 
evaluative work conducted on GDC projects in Afghanistan. The 
framework of analysis is described in detail in Annex C, clearly 
showing that this review is not a meta-evaluation of project level 
work.
All documents were categorized into one of the following three 
categories: (i) evaluative work at the project and program level, 
(ii) work above the program or at the strategic level (iii) work that 
is related to the GDC’s M&E system in Afghanistan. 
Project or program level evaluative work:
Upon request GIZ and KfW sent their evaluative work conducted 
on BMZ funded projects in Afghanistan to DEval. A list with 127 
documents was received. However, based on the international 
quality standards for development evaluation set by the OECD / 
DAC (2010b), many of these documents do not qualify to be 
considered evaluation.
In a first step only documents that qualify as evaluations or 
have several elements of evaluation were selected. These were 
considered to be evaluative work for the purposes of this review. 
The ex-post evaluations (4), impact assessments (2), project 
progress reviews (21) and e-VAL reports (10) were included into 
this category, which narrowed the list of documents down to 
37 pieces of work (of these, four documents were from the KfW 
work and 33 documents from the GIZ). A sample of 11 documents 
was drawn from these 38 remaining documents. Two to three 
reports of each type were randomly selected. Drawing a small 
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sample size was a response to the time and budget constraints of 
this review. 
In a second step an assessment of the quality of each of the 
11 evaluative works was completed by applying a standardized 
set of criteria established by the authors. This step considered 
the evaluation approach in more detail: methods selected and 
applied; evaluation criteria selected and applied; triangulation 
of information; relevance of evaluation focus, questions and rec-
ommendations; and connections between findings, conclusions, 
recommendations, and project ratings. The assessment criteria 
are presented in detail in Annex C. The results of the assessment 
are presented in Annex D.
Strategic level evaluative work
Two pieces of work under the auspices of BMZ were identified 
as innovative and highly relevant for an overall assessment 
of how GDC’s portfolio has been evaluated so far: the impact 
assessment in North East Afghanistan conducted by Zürcher et 
al. (2007a, 2010), and the strategic portfolio review (Zürcher et 
al. 2013), which was commissioned by BMZ in 2012 in support of 
developing the new country strategy for Afghanistan. Both of 
these reveal information above the project or program level and 
are more strategic in nature. While the portfolio review is not 
an evaluation per se, it provides relevant strategic level analysis 
which has underpinned GDC’s strategic decision-making in 
Afghanistan. Thus, it falls within this second category of analyti-
cal work presently available. A third set of documents within this 
category includes country level evaluations conducted by other 
international donors operating in Afghanistan. 
The first two documents became subject to the document 
analysis based on the assessment framework presented in Annex 
C. Results of this review are presented in chapter 3.1 of this 
report. The main results of strategic evaluations conducted by 
other international donors have been summarized. These results 
were also drawn at an international conference which took place 
in the UK in February 2012 and have been presented at more 
length in chapter 3.1.
In a third step the analysis concentrated on the usage of the 
evaluations within BMZ and its implementing partners operating 
in Afghanistan. Here project as well as strategic level work was 
included. The focus was to look at issues of dissemination of the 
evaluations and how the evaluation findings were utilized to 
inform project / program planning and strategic decision-making. 
This involved an analysis of the lessons learned and recommen-
dations presented in the evaluations themselves to determine 
whether they were grounded, actionable, and feasible for use in 
program planning and strategic decision-making. Key informant 
interviews were conducted to delve more deeply into the ques-
tion of how the evaluations and the results of those evaluations 
have been used within the BMZ and its implementing partner 
organizations. 
The M&E System
This category includes the description of a tracking system of 
project activities at the output level. This database has been 
included because it compiles information on all German devel-
opment projects in Afghanistan, not just those funded by BMZ. 
Thus, it can provide insights for developing the existing M&E 
system further. 
Finally, additional secondary resources, such as operational 
guidelines and strategic plans were also reviewed, along with 
evaluative works stemming from other development cooperation 
actors working in Afghanistan.
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DEval has received 127 documents from the GIZ and the 
KfW, which encompass the evaluative work of their projects 
and / or programs in Afghanistan. These documents include 
final reports (Schlussberichte), project progress reports 
(Projektfortschrittsberichte), project progress reviews (Projekt-
fortschrittskontrolle), audits (Berichte von Wirtschaftsprüfun-
gen), ex-post evaluations, and e-VAL reports. As stated in the 
main text of this review, only a few of these evaluative works 
can be considered complete evaluations according to interna-
tional standards. Along these standards, evaluations should be 
made available to the public. Other types of reports serve to 
meet internal reporting requirements. In consideration of the 
confidential interests of the implementing organizations, the 
list of all documents provided is not included here.
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T
he evaluation criteria established for this research is 
grounded on the OECD / DAC principles and quality 
standards for development evaluation.150 Extracting 
from these two references, it was determined that this 
assessment of evaluation of German development cooperation in 
Afghanistan would focus on the quality of the purpose, approach, 
implementation, and findings. These areas are broken down 
below into a set of questions that was asked of each evaluative 
work reviewed, in addition to general descriptive questions on 
the evaluative work. The question, answers, and purpose / com-
ments are included in the chart below. 
Evaluation Quality
Question Answer Purpose / Comments
Type of data gathered a. Qualitative
b. Quantitative
c. Mixed
d. Unknown
To see if there is a strong lean in the type of data 
collected.
What data gathering approaches were used? a. Key informant interviews
b. Focus Group Discussions
c. Representative Survey
d. Non-representative Survey
e. Observations
f. Secondary Materials
g. Other: specify ______________
h. Unknown
This highlights the approaches used, which can help 
determine if other approaches should also be applied.
Over what time frame did this evaluation take place? These questions look at the resources made available 
for the evaluations to determine whether more 
resources should be recommended. The budget 
can be to calculate the % marked for evalutions in 
comparison to an international standard of 1 – 5 % of 
total funds.
How much money was dedicated to this evaluation?
How many people worked on this evaluation?
How independent was the evaluation team? a. Very independent: entirely external
b. Almost entirely independent: External and 
independent evaluation department
c. Somewhat independent: independent evaluation 
department 
d. Somewhat less independent: external with 
project / program staff
e. Less independent: independent evaluation 
department with project / program staff
f. Not independent: project / program staff
g. Not clear from the evaluation
Independence contributes to the quality of work 
as the more independent the evaluation is, the less 
biased it likely to be perceived.
150  OECD (1991, 2010b)
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Question Answer Purpose / Comments
Diversity of Informants:
 • diverse across implementation levels within  
the organization (e.g. includes field staff)
 • diverse across stakeholders (e.g. includes 
participants)
 • diverse across gender of participants
 • diverse in terms of internal vs. external
 • diverse across primary and secondary sources
a. M Participants
b. Participants
c. Local Field project / program staff
d. International project / program staff
e. Local Central office staff
f. International Central office staff
g. GIRoA officials
h. Other implementers or partners
i. Project / Program documents
j. GIRoA reports
k. Other stakeholder reports 
l. Unknown
This can help identify whether there are gaps in the 
sourcing of information that should / could be filled to 
enhance quality.
Is the rational or purpose of the evaluation clearly 
stated?
a. Yes
b. No
Clarity, which is needed for quality.
How relevant is the purpose of the evaluation to the 
objectives or goals of the BMZ in Afghanistan?
BMZ priorities: Good governance,
Energy, Water, Economic de vel op ment and employ-
ment promotion, Basic education and vocational 
training
a. Strongly relevant, directly addresses at least one 
BMZ priority
b. Somewhat relevant, partially addresses at least 
one BZM priority
c. Not relevant at all, does not address any BMZ 
priority
d. Unknown
Alignment to the objectives of the BMZ to determine 
if this is something that is missing the in current 
evaluations.
How relevant is the purpose of the evaluation to the 
objectives or goals of the Afghan government?
GIRoA NPP Priorities: Peace, Governance, Human 
Resources Dev., Infrastructure Dev., Private Sector 
Dev., and Agriculture and Rural Dev.
a. Strongly relevant, directly addresses at least one 
GIRoA priority
b. Somewhat relevant, partially addresses at least 
one GIRoA priority
c. Not relevant at all, does not address any GIRoA 
priority
d. Unknown
Alignment to the objectives of the Afghan govern-
ment to determine if this is something that is missing 
in the current evaluations.
What is the quality of the evaluation criteria?
“Clearly laid out” means that they are easily 
identifiable
a. High quality, clearly laid out and S.M.A.R.T.
b. Medium quality, clearly laid out but not all 
S.M.A.R.T.
c. Low quality, not clearly laid out or S.M.A.R.T.
This also determines the quality of the evaluation 
because if the criteria are not defined and clarified 
then this raises questions on how reliable the results 
are.
Criteria are seen as appropriate if they line up with 
the objectives and are S.M.A.R.T. (Specific, Measura-
ble, Achievable, Relevant, and Timebound)
Was the data collected triangulated? a. Clear efforts to triangulate data evident
b. Some, limited efforts to triangulate data evident
c. No efforts to triangulate data evident
d. Not clear, this was not clearly indicated in the 
evaluation report
Triangulation increases robustness, which increases 
quality.
Were the limitations of the findings, or challenges 
encountered in the field, provided?
a. Yes, limitations were outlined
b. No, limitations were not outlined
Outlining limitations indicates the recognition of the 
robustness of the data, which is connected to quality.
Do the recommendations stem logically from the 
findings and conclusions?
a. Yes, all of them
b. At least half of them
c. Less than half
d. No, none of them
e. Not applicable, no recommendations
This provides information about the quality of the 
recommendations and whether or not they are 
grounded in the findings and conclusions stemming 
from the research.
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Question Answer Purpose / Comments
How successful did the evaluation find the 
project / program?
a. Very successful, it accomplished all of its 
objectives
b. Mostly successful, more positive than negative 
results
c. Mostly unsuccessful, more negative than positive 
results
d. Not successful, it did not accomplish any of its 
objectives
e. Not about success per say
This will give an idea of how well GDC is viewed as 
doing in terms of delivery projects / programs that 
work.
Were best practices of lessons learned provided? a. Yes
b. No
This indicates whether the evaluation has produced 
actionable advice or recommendations.
If yes, what were they? If there is time, this allows to compare recommen-
dations to see how they differ across time, across 
sectors, etc., which would provide information on 
whether the recommendations have truly been 
integrated into planning.
What does the evaluation tell us about the sustaina-
bility of the project / program?
a. Very sustainable, it is, or will be, sustainable on its 
own at the end of project
b. Sustainable in the near future, it is seen as 
sustainable with limited additional assistance 
(perhaps one more year or support)
c. Sustainable with GIRoA support
d. Sustainable only with GDC assistance
e. Not sustainable at all
f. Sustainability not seen as relevant (humanitarian 
effort or one time effort)
g. Sustainability not mentioned in the evaluation
h. Concerns about sustainability because of security 
situation
i. Other: ________________
Sustainability is highlighted in the Wilton Park report 
and therefore it is included in order to determine 
whether this is an area which needs more concentra-
tion in GDC in Afghanistan.
Were sources of data clearly cited? a. Yes, always
b. Yes, sometimes
c. No, never
Allows for an assessment of the validity of data.
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Implementing Partner 
Organization
KfW KfW KfW KfW GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ
Project / Program Title Unterstützung zu Vor-
haben des Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust 
Fund (ARTF IV, V, and VI)
Aufbau einer Mikro-
finanzbank / First 
Microfinance Bank
Aufbau einer Mikro-
finanz bank / First 
Microfinance Bank
Northern Economic Infra-
structure Development 
Project
Gender in Northern 
Afghanistan (Rural 
Integration fund RI)
Strengthening Livelihood 
Systems (formerly 
Regional Integration 
Fund)
Programme for 
Sustainable Economic 
Development in the 
North and in Kabul
Diversification of 
Agrculture in Baghlan 
(sugar factory included)
Afghanistan Water 
Sector Institutional 
Development Project
Rehabilitation of basic in-
frastructure and income 
generation in rural areas 
in North Afghanistan
Gender Mainstreaming 
in Afghanistan
Sector of Project 
a. Good governance /  
b. Education / c. Water or 
Sanitation / d. Economic 
Dev. / e. Education /  
f. Other / g. Energy
a. Good governance 
d. Economic dev.
d. Economic Dev d. Economic Dev a. Good Governance 
d. Economic Dev. 
(Infratructure)
f. Other (Gender) a. Good Governance d. Economic Dev. 
(2010.2210.2)
d. Economic Dev. 
(Agriculture)
c. Water / Sanitation a. Good governance 
f. Other (Rural 
Development)
f. Other  
(Gender)
Start and End of Project / 
Program (if applicable)
2004 – 2006 2004 – no info provided 2004 – no info provided no info provided no info provided 2008 – 2012 May 2010 – Dec 2018 May 2010 – Dec 2013 Jun 2003 – Dec 2005 Mar 2008 – Dec 2011 Nov 2004 – Dez 2009
Project / Program Budget 
in Euro (if applicable)
55 million 1.5 million 3.5 million no info provided no info provided 4.75 million 24 million (through 2013) 11 million 2 million no info provided no info provided
Date of Evaluation Jul 2005 Jul 2005 Jul 2005 Sep 2012 Mar 2012 Oct 2012 Jul 2011 Jun 2011 Sep 2005 Jul 2011 Jun 2009
1. What type of 
evaluation is this?
c. Summative: ex-post c. Summative: ex-post c. Summative: ex-post c. Summative: post 
impact assessment
c. Summative: classified 
as impact analysis, how-
ever does not qualify as 
such in our assessment
c. Summative: classified 
as impact analysis, how-
ever does not qualify as 
such in our assessment
b. Midline b. Midline (PFK) b. Midline (PFK) 
(End of phase progress 
report)
b. Midline (e-VAL) 
(Stakeholders opinions 
were gathered to feed 
into the Project Progress 
Report)
b. Midline (e-VAL) 
(Opinions and percep-
tions were gathered.)
2. What is the scope of 
this evaluation?
b. Trust fund a. Project a. Project a. Project b. Regional Fund b. Program a. Project a. Project a. Project a. Project a. Project
3. What is the focus of 
the evaluation level?
b. Outputs 
c. Outcomes
b. Outputs b. Outputs b. Outputs 
c. Outcomes
c. Outcomes 
d. Impacts (But not well 
supported.)
b. Outputs 
c. Outcomes
e. Process e. Process (Setting-up 
process, not movement 
on indicators)
b. Outputs 
e. Process
b. Outputs 
e. Process
a. Inputs, b. Outputs 
c. Outcomes, d. Impacts
4. Which methods were 
used?
h. Desk Review h. Desk Review 
(Too dangerous to visit)
h. Desk Review 
(Too dangerous to visit)
h. Desk Review 
i. Other 
j. Key informant 
interviews (FGD)
l. Unknown 
(No details are provided 
on the survey, nor of 
what it is consisted.)
c. Partiicpatory 
h. Desk review
h. Desk review 
j. Key informant 
interviews 
K. field visit
l. Unknown l. Unknown j. Key informant 
interviews
j. Key informant 
interviews
5. Type of data gathered c. Mixed b. Quantitative b. Quantitative c. Mixed c. Mixed c. Mixed (Quantitative 
data came from reports 
and qualitative from 
interviews.)
b. Quantitative c. Mixed 
(Briefly addressed 
quantiative goals, and 
provided some statistics)
c. Mixed c. Mixed c. Mixed
6. Over what time frame 
did this evaluation take 
place?
no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided 3 months 1 month no info provided 2 months 2 months no info provided
7. How much money 
was dedicated to this 
evaluation?
no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided
8. How many people 
worked on this 
evaluation?
3 listed 3 listed 3 listed no info provided no info provided 2 authors cited 2 authors cited no info provided 1 1 listed 2
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Implementing Partner 
Organization
KfW KfW KfW KfW GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ
Project / Program Title Unterstützung zu Vor-
haben des Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust 
Fund (ARTF IV, V, and VI)
Aufbau einer Mikro-
finanzbank / First 
Microfinance Bank
Aufbau einer Mikro-
finanz bank / First 
Microfinance Bank
Northern Economic Infra-
structure Development 
Project
Gender in Northern 
Afghanistan (Rural 
Integration fund RI)
Strengthening Livelihood 
Systems (formerly 
Regional Integration 
Fund)
Programme for 
Sustainable Economic 
Development in the 
North and in Kabul
Diversification of 
Agrculture in Baghlan 
(sugar factory included)
Afghanistan Water 
Sector Institutional 
Development Project
Rehabilitation of basic in-
frastructure and income 
generation in rural areas 
in North Afghanistan
Gender Mainstreaming 
in Afghanistan
Sector of Project 
a. Good governance /  
b. Education / c. Water or 
Sanitation / d. Economic 
Dev. / e. Education /  
f. Other / g. Energy
a. Good governance 
d. Economic dev.
d. Economic Dev d. Economic Dev a. Good Governance 
d. Economic Dev. 
(Infratructure)
f. Other (Gender) a. Good Governance d. Economic Dev. 
(2010.2210.2)
d. Economic Dev. 
(Agriculture)
c. Water / Sanitation a. Good governance 
f. Other (Rural 
Development)
f. Other  
(Gender)
Start and End of Project / 
Program (if applicable)
2004 – 2006 2004 – no info provided 2004 – no info provided no info provided no info provided 2008 – 2012 May 2010 – Dec 2018 May 2010 – Dec 2013 Jun 2003 – Dec 2005 Mar 2008 – Dec 2011 Nov 2004 – Dez 2009
Project / Program Budget 
in Euro (if applicable)
55 million 1.5 million 3.5 million no info provided no info provided 4.75 million 24 million (through 2013) 11 million 2 million no info provided no info provided
Date of Evaluation Jul 2005 Jul 2005 Jul 2005 Sep 2012 Mar 2012 Oct 2012 Jul 2011 Jun 2011 Sep 2005 Jul 2011 Jun 2009
1. What type of 
evaluation is this?
c. Summative: ex-post c. Summative: ex-post c. Summative: ex-post c. Summative: post 
impact assessment
c. Summative: classified 
as impact analysis, how-
ever does not qualify as 
such in our assessment
c. Summative: classified 
as impact analysis, how-
ever does not qualify as 
such in our assessment
b. Midline b. Midline (PFK) b. Midline (PFK) 
(End of phase progress 
report)
b. Midline (e-VAL) 
(Stakeholders opinions 
were gathered to feed 
into the Project Progress 
Report)
b. Midline (e-VAL) 
(Opinions and percep-
tions were gathered.)
2. What is the scope of 
this evaluation?
b. Trust fund a. Project a. Project a. Project b. Regional Fund b. Program a. Project a. Project a. Project a. Project a. Project
3. What is the focus of 
the evaluation level?
b. Outputs 
c. Outcomes
b. Outputs b. Outputs b. Outputs 
c. Outcomes
c. Outcomes 
d. Impacts (But not well 
supported.)
b. Outputs 
c. Outcomes
e. Process e. Process (Setting-up 
process, not movement 
on indicators)
b. Outputs 
e. Process
b. Outputs 
e. Process
a. Inputs, b. Outputs 
c. Outcomes, d. Impacts
4. Which methods were 
used?
h. Desk Review h. Desk Review 
(Too dangerous to visit)
h. Desk Review 
(Too dangerous to visit)
h. Desk Review 
i. Other 
j. Key informant 
interviews (FGD)
l. Unknown 
(No details are provided 
on the survey, nor of 
what it is consisted.)
c. Partiicpatory 
h. Desk review
h. Desk review 
j. Key informant 
interviews 
K. field visit
l. Unknown l. Unknown j. Key informant 
interviews
j. Key informant 
interviews
5. Type of data gathered c. Mixed b. Quantitative b. Quantitative c. Mixed c. Mixed c. Mixed (Quantitative 
data came from reports 
and qualitative from 
interviews.)
b. Quantitative c. Mixed 
(Briefly addressed 
quantiative goals, and 
provided some statistics)
c. Mixed c. Mixed c. Mixed
6. Over what time frame 
did this evaluation take 
place?
no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided 3 months 1 month no info provided 2 months 2 months no info provided
7. How much money 
was dedicated to this 
evaluation?
no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided
8. How many people 
worked on this 
evaluation?
3 listed 3 listed 3 listed no info provided no info provided 2 authors cited 2 authors cited no info provided 1 1 listed 2
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Implementing Partner 
Organization
KfW KfW KfW KfW GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ
9. How independent was 
the evaluation team?
b. Mostly independent 
(2 FE-Z and 1 exernal)
c. Somewhat independ-
ent 
(3 FE-Z)
b. Mostly independent 
(2 FE-Z and 1 external)
a. Very independent 
(JBG Gauff Ingenieure)
g. Not clear 
(The author of the report 
works for GIZ and the 
methodology is not 
clear.)
g. Not clear f. Not independent 
(One was on the 
Afghanistan Task Force 
and the other came from 
Af / Pak Team)
f. Not independent 
(conducted by GIZ staff 
member)
d. Somewhat less 
independent 
(This was conducted by 
an external consultant, 
but one who had been 
involved in the planning 
of the project.)
a. Very independent 
(External consultant.)
d. Somewhat less 
independent
10. Diversity of sources of 
information
i. Proj / Prog documents 
k. Other stakeholder 
reports
i. Proj / Prog documents 
k. Other stakeholder 
reports
i. Proj / Prog documents 
k. Other stakeholder 
reports 
(Mentioned in the text, 
but not connected to all 
stats given)
a. M Participants (Very 
limited in number, 6 for 
household survey.) 
g. GoA officials
b. F Participants 
(This was not enitrely 
clear, but they did include 
quotes from female 
participants, so at least 
female participants)
a. M Participants 
b. F Participants 
c. Local proj / prog staff 
d. Int. proj / prog staff 
f. Int. Central Office staff 
i. Proj / Prog documents 
k. Other Stakeholder 
reports
e. Local Central Office 
staff 
i. Proj / Prog documents 
k. Other Stakeholder 
reports  
(Project managers, 
partners, BMZ, desk 
research, field visits, 
politicians. Local Central 
Office staff)
l. Unknown f. Int. Central Office staff 
g. GoA Officials 
h. Other implementers or 
partners 
l. Proj / prog Documents 
j. GoA reports 
k. Other stakeholder 
reports
c., d., e., f., g., h.  
(Project staff, GoA, 
implementing partner, 
and other stakeholders) 
f. Int. Central Office staff 
g. GoA Officials 
h. Other implementers or 
partners
11. Is the rational or pur-
pose of the evaluation 
clearly stated?
Not sure a. Yes 
(Requirement of BMZ)
b. No b. No a. Yes 
(To look at the impact of 
RI funds on women)
a. Yes a. Yes b. No 
(It can assumed that 
this is an end-of-year 
summary.)
a. Yes a. Yes 
(to gain stakeholder 
opinions)
a. Yes
12. How relevant is the 
purpose of the evalu-
ation to the objectives 
or goals of the BMZ in 
Afghanistan? 
a. Strongly relevant a. Strongly relevant no info provided d. Unknown a. Strongly relevant a. Strongly relevant 
(Though this is not 
stated.)
a. Strongly relevant 
(Though this is not 
stated.)
no info provided a. Strongly relevant a. Strongly relevant 
(Feeds into PPR)
a. Strongly relevant 
(Feeds into PPR)
13. How relevant is the 
purpose of the evaluation 
to the objectives or goals 
of the Government of 
Afghanistan?
a. Strongly relevant a. Strongly relevant no info provided d. Unknown a. Strongly relevant a. Strongly relevant 
(Though this is not 
stated.)
a. Strongly relevant 
(Clearly stated)
no info provided a. Strongly relevant d. Unknown d. Unknown
14. Are evaluation criteria 
and indicators clearly 
outlined and of good 
quality?
a. High quality 
(The indicators focused 
on large-scale changes in 
Afghanistan in general.)
a. High quality a. High quality 
(The criteria are generic, 
but relevant. However, 
it is not clear how they 
came to the numbers 
stated.) 
b. Medium Not clarified a. High quality  
(It was clear)
b. Medium 
(Not quite clear)
no info provided  b. Medium  
(Not really clarified; the 
evaluators just looked at 
indicators.)
a. High quality a. High quality
15. Was the data collected 
triangulated?
a. Clear efforts  
(They provided multiple 
sets of numbers from 
different reports, which 
were differentiated.)
d. Not clear d. Not clear d. Not clear d. Not clear b. Some limited efforts d. Not clear d. Not clear d. Not clear a. Clear efforts a. Clear efforts
16. Were the limitations 
of the approach and 
findings or challenges 
encountered in the field, 
provided?
a. Yes 
(Yes, it is frequently 
mentioned that the 
evaluators were unable 
to make judgements due 
to lack of data.) 
a. Yes 
(Yes, it is frequently 
mentioned that the 
evaluators were unable 
to make judgements due 
to lack of data.) 
a. Yes 
(Yes, it is frequently 
mentioned that the 
evaluators were unable 
to make judgements due 
to lack of data.) 
a. Yes 
(Security and restrictions 
which were placed on 
HHS.)
b. No a. Yes 
(Very clearly stated)
b. No 
(Challenges to the 
project are stated, but 
not to the research for 
the evaluation.)
b. No, regarding the 
evaluation approach. 
(However, limitations or 
challenges faced by the 
project were listed.)
a. Yes 
(Evaluators involvement 
in planning was clearly 
stated.)
b. No a. Yes
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Implementing Partner 
Organization
KfW KfW KfW KfW GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ
9. How independent was 
the evaluation team?
b. Mostly independent 
(2 FE-Z and 1 exernal)
c. Somewhat independ-
ent 
(3 FE-Z)
b. Mostly independent 
(2 FE-Z and 1 external)
a. Very independent 
(JBG Gauff Ingenieure)
g. Not clear 
(The author of the report 
works for GIZ and the 
methodology is not 
clear.)
g. Not clear f. Not independent 
(One was on the 
Afghanistan Task Force 
and the other came from 
Af / Pak Team)
f. Not independent 
(conducted by GIZ staff 
member)
d. Somewhat less 
independent 
(This was conducted by 
an external consultant, 
but one who had been 
involved in the planning 
of the project.)
a. Very independent 
(External consultant.)
d. Somewhat less 
independent
10. Diversity of sources of 
information
i. Proj / Prog documents 
k. Other stakeholder 
reports
i. Proj / Prog documents 
k. Other stakeholder 
reports
i. Proj / Prog documents 
k. Other stakeholder 
reports 
(Mentioned in the text, 
but not connected to all 
stats given)
a. M Participants (Very 
limited in number, 6 for 
household survey.) 
g. GoA officials
b. F Participants 
(This was not enitrely 
clear, but they did include 
quotes from female 
participants, so at least 
female participants)
a. M Participants 
b. F Participants 
c. Local proj / prog staff 
d. Int. proj / prog staff 
f. Int. Central Office staff 
i. Proj / Prog documents 
k. Other Stakeholder 
reports
e. Local Central Office 
staff 
i. Proj / Prog documents 
k. Other Stakeholder 
reports  
(Project managers, 
partners, BMZ, desk 
research, field visits, 
politicians. Local Central 
Office staff)
l. Unknown f. Int. Central Office staff 
g. GoA Officials 
h. Other implementers or 
partners 
l. Proj / prog Documents 
j. GoA reports 
k. Other stakeholder 
reports
c., d., e., f., g., h.  
(Project staff, GoA, 
implementing partner, 
and other stakeholders) 
f. Int. Central Office staff 
g. GoA Officials 
h. Other implementers or 
partners
11. Is the rational or pur-
pose of the evaluation 
clearly stated?
Not sure a. Yes 
(Requirement of BMZ)
b. No b. No a. Yes 
(To look at the impact of 
RI funds on women)
a. Yes a. Yes b. No 
(It can assumed that 
this is an end-of-year 
summary.)
a. Yes a. Yes 
(to gain stakeholder 
opinions)
a. Yes
12. How relevant is the 
purpose of the evalu-
ation to the objectives 
or goals of the BMZ in 
Afghanistan? 
a. Strongly relevant a. Strongly relevant no info provided d. Unknown a. Strongly relevant a. Strongly relevant 
(Though this is not 
stated.)
a. Strongly relevant 
(Though this is not 
stated.)
no info provided a. Strongly relevant a. Strongly relevant 
(Feeds into PPR)
a. Strongly relevant 
(Feeds into PPR)
13. How relevant is the 
purpose of the evaluation 
to the objectives or goals 
of the Government of 
Afghanistan?
a. Strongly relevant a. Strongly relevant no info provided d. Unknown a. Strongly relevant a. Strongly relevant 
(Though this is not 
stated.)
a. Strongly relevant 
(Clearly stated)
no info provided a. Strongly relevant d. Unknown d. Unknown
14. Are evaluation criteria 
and indicators clearly 
outlined and of good 
quality?
a. High quality 
(The indicators focused 
on large-scale changes in 
Afghanistan in general.)
a. High quality a. High quality 
(The criteria are generic, 
but relevant. However, 
it is not clear how they 
came to the numbers 
stated.) 
b. Medium Not clarified a. High quality  
(It was clear)
b. Medium 
(Not quite clear)
no info provided  b. Medium  
(Not really clarified; the 
evaluators just looked at 
indicators.)
a. High quality a. High quality
15. Was the data collected 
triangulated?
a. Clear efforts  
(They provided multiple 
sets of numbers from 
different reports, which 
were differentiated.)
d. Not clear d. Not clear d. Not clear d. Not clear b. Some limited efforts d. Not clear d. Not clear d. Not clear a. Clear efforts a. Clear efforts
16. Were the limitations 
of the approach and 
findings or challenges 
encountered in the field, 
provided?
a. Yes 
(Yes, it is frequently 
mentioned that the 
evaluators were unable 
to make judgements due 
to lack of data.) 
a. Yes 
(Yes, it is frequently 
mentioned that the 
evaluators were unable 
to make judgements due 
to lack of data.) 
a. Yes 
(Yes, it is frequently 
mentioned that the 
evaluators were unable 
to make judgements due 
to lack of data.) 
a. Yes 
(Security and restrictions 
which were placed on 
HHS.)
b. No a. Yes 
(Very clearly stated)
b. No 
(Challenges to the 
project are stated, but 
not to the research for 
the evaluation.)
b. No, regarding the 
evaluation approach. 
(However, limitations or 
challenges faced by the 
project were listed.)
a. Yes 
(Evaluators involvement 
in planning was clearly 
stated.)
b. No a. Yes
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Implementing Partner 
Organization
KfW KfW KfW KfW GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ
17. Do the recommen-
dations stem logically 
from the findings and 
conclusions?
e. Not applicable, no 
recommendations 
(However, lessons 
learned could be 
extracted from the 
description.) 
e. Not applicable, no 
recommendations 
(However, lessons 
learned could be 
extracted from the 
description.) 
e. Not applicable, no 
recommendations 
(However, lessons 
learned could be 
extracted from the 
description.) 
e. Not applicable, no 
recommendations
d. No, none 
(Recommendations do 
not stem from presented 
data)
a. Yes, all b. At least half e. No recommendations b. At least half a. Yes, all 
(The recommendations 
stem from stakeholders.)
a. Yes, all
18. How was the overall 
performance of the 
project / program rated?
b. Mostly successful b. Mostly successful b. Mostly successful (The 
rating given was „2“.)
a. Very successful a. Very successful b. Mostly successful e. No rating provided e. No rating provided 
(Project was still in its 
start up phase.)
b. Mostly successful 
(They had suggestions 
for changes, but recom-
mended to continue the 
program.)
b. Mostly successful b. Mostly successful
19. Were best practices of 
lessons learned provid-
ed? Recommendations?
b. No b. No (Although these 
could be extracted from 
the text where responses 
to problems are given, 
there was no evaluation 
of whether these were 
best practice.)
b. No (Although these 
could be extracted from 
the text where responses 
to problems are given, 
there was no evaluation 
of whether these were 
best practice.)
b. No a. Yes a. Yes a. Yes b. No a. Yes b. No a. Yes
20. If yes, what were 
they?
no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided Agriculture / food security 
projects can improve 
women‘s social and 
household status.
Various lessons learned 
were described for each 
of the 28 different case 
study projects observed 
and therefore are not 
listed here.
Lessons on moving 
forward are presented.
No Component 3 should 
not be continued. The 
project need stronger 
counterparts in the 
ministry, etc.
no info provided They covered specific 
lessons to different 
topics. These are good, 
but include too many 
details to capture here.
21. What does the 
evaluation tell us about 
the sustainability of the 
project / program?
f. Sustainability not seen 
as relevant
h. Concerns about 
sustainability because of 
security situation
h. Concerns about 
sustainability because of 
security situation
g. Sustainability not 
mentioned
g. Security not 
mentioned
i. Other 
(Sustainability was 
discussed for each 
project and it varied)
i. Other 
(Sustainability was 
discussed for different 
aspects of the project, 
but not for all)
i. Other 
(The issue of sustaina-
bility was not focused 
on since the project has 
just begun and still has a 
number of years to run.)
d. Sustainable with GDC 
assistance 
(This includes a longer-
term perspective with 
the project expected to 
run 10 years.)
g. Sustainability not 
mentioned
g. Sustainability not 
mentioned
22. Works cited? b. Yes, sometimes 
(Works are not cited, 
sometimes – but not 
often – reports are 
mentioned.)
b. Yes, sometimes 
(Works are not cited, 
sometimes – but not 
often – reports are 
mentioned.)
b. Yes, sometimes 
(Works are not cited, 
sometimes – but not 
often – reports are 
mentioned.)
b. Yes, sometimes b. Yes, sometimes a. Yes, always b. Yes, sometimes c. No, never a. Yes, always b. Yes, sometimes c. No, never 
(But not needed)
Extra information / 
comments
Report Number 
10.130.90.44 
Conducted in 2010
Report Number 
1268168387 
Conducted in 2009 
Does not provide 
information on the works 
cited nor any citations to 
refer to.
Conducted 2011 The number of 
informants was very low 
and limited to only men. 
Causality was assumed 
instead of actually 
shown. 
This report provided 
a few case studies of 
RI projects and then 
listed impacts without 
providing evidence of 
how they were measured. 
The methodology was 
not clear and there was 
no transparency on 
how data was obtained. 
Therefore, generally not 
of good quality.
A well done evaluation, 
which clearly states pros 
and cons. Unfortunately, 
it does not provide a final 
analysis or summary.
OECD / DAC is 
mentioned. The lack of 
baseline data is problem-
atic. The Methododology 
is not set up for future 
impact analysis.
This was a simple 
descriptive report.
This can be considered 
an evaluation.  
(Project No. 2007.2118.3) 
Clearly laid out stake-
holders opinions analysis. 
No baseline data for 
comparison has been 
provided. However, 
the approach was very 
informative as it provided 
different stakeholders‘ 
opinions and compares 
their impressions.
57 Assessment of Reviewed Evaluation Reports  |  D.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Implementing Partner 
Organization
KfW KfW KfW KfW GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ GIZ
17. Do the recommen-
dations stem logically 
from the findings and 
conclusions?
e. Not applicable, no 
recommendations 
(However, lessons 
learned could be 
extracted from the 
description.) 
e. Not applicable, no 
recommendations 
(However, lessons 
learned could be 
extracted from the 
description.) 
e. Not applicable, no 
recommendations 
(However, lessons 
learned could be 
extracted from the 
description.) 
e. Not applicable, no 
recommendations
d. No, none 
(Recommendations do 
not stem from presented 
data)
a. Yes, all b. At least half e. No recommendations b. At least half a. Yes, all 
(The recommendations 
stem from stakeholders.)
a. Yes, all
18. How was the overall 
performance of the 
project / program rated?
b. Mostly successful b. Mostly successful b. Mostly successful (The 
rating given was „2“.)
a. Very successful a. Very successful b. Mostly successful e. No rating provided e. No rating provided 
(Project was still in its 
start up phase.)
b. Mostly successful 
(They had suggestions 
for changes, but recom-
mended to continue the 
program.)
b. Mostly successful b. Mostly successful
19. Were best practices of 
lessons learned provid-
ed? Recommendations?
b. No b. No (Although these 
could be extracted from 
the text where responses 
to problems are given, 
there was no evaluation 
of whether these were 
best practice.)
b. No (Although these 
could be extracted from 
the text where responses 
to problems are given, 
there was no evaluation 
of whether these were 
best practice.)
b. No a. Yes a. Yes a. Yes b. No a. Yes b. No a. Yes
20. If yes, what were 
they?
no info provided no info provided no info provided no info provided Agriculture / food security 
projects can improve 
women‘s social and 
household status.
Various lessons learned 
were described for each 
of the 28 different case 
study projects observed 
and therefore are not 
listed here.
Lessons on moving 
forward are presented.
No Component 3 should 
not be continued. The 
project need stronger 
counterparts in the 
ministry, etc.
no info provided They covered specific 
lessons to different 
topics. These are good, 
but include too many 
details to capture here.
21. What does the 
evaluation tell us about 
the sustainability of the 
project / program?
f. Sustainability not seen 
as relevant
h. Concerns about 
sustainability because of 
security situation
h. Concerns about 
sustainability because of 
security situation
g. Sustainability not 
mentioned
g. Security not 
mentioned
i. Other 
(Sustainability was 
discussed for each 
project and it varied)
i. Other 
(Sustainability was 
discussed for different 
aspects of the project, 
but not for all)
i. Other 
(The issue of sustaina-
bility was not focused 
on since the project has 
just begun and still has a 
number of years to run.)
d. Sustainable with GDC 
assistance 
(This includes a longer-
term perspective with 
the project expected to 
run 10 years.)
g. Sustainability not 
mentioned
g. Sustainability not 
mentioned
22. Works cited? b. Yes, sometimes 
(Works are not cited, 
sometimes – but not 
often – reports are 
mentioned.)
b. Yes, sometimes 
(Works are not cited, 
sometimes – but not 
often – reports are 
mentioned.)
b. Yes, sometimes 
(Works are not cited, 
sometimes – but not 
often – reports are 
mentioned.)
b. Yes, sometimes b. Yes, sometimes a. Yes, always b. Yes, sometimes c. No, never a. Yes, always b. Yes, sometimes c. No, never 
(But not needed)
Extra information / 
comments
Report Number 
10.130.90.44 
Conducted in 2010
Report Number 
1268168387 
Conducted in 2009 
Does not provide 
information on the works 
cited nor any citations to 
refer to.
Conducted 2011 The number of 
informants was very low 
and limited to only men. 
Causality was assumed 
instead of actually 
shown. 
This report provided 
a few case studies of 
RI projects and then 
listed impacts without 
providing evidence of 
how they were measured. 
The methodology was 
not clear and there was 
no transparency on 
how data was obtained. 
Therefore, generally not 
of good quality.
A well done evaluation, 
which clearly states pros 
and cons. Unfortunately, 
it does not provide a final 
analysis or summary.
OECD / DAC is 
mentioned. The lack of 
baseline data is problem-
atic. The Methododology 
is not set up for future 
impact analysis.
This was a simple 
descriptive report.
This can be considered 
an evaluation.  
(Project No. 2007.2118.3) 
Clearly laid out stake-
holders opinions analysis. 
No baseline data for 
comparison has been 
provided. However, 
the approach was very 
informative as it provided 
different stakeholders‘ 
opinions and compares 
their impressions.
ANNEX E.
LIST OF KFW AND 
GIZ DEVELOPMENT 
 COOPERATION 
 PROJECTS IN 
AFGHANISTAN
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a) List of KfW Development Cooperation Projects in Afghanistan (BMZ-funded)
Sector 151 Funding 
Ministry
Project No. Project Name Committed 
funds in Euro
Education BMZ 2002 65 116 Offenes Programm Bildung (AFG) 2.000.000,00
BMZ 2003 65 791 Gesundheits- und Bildungsprogramm Badghis (Subkomponente Wiederaufbau-
programm) Achtung: auch bei Gesundheit aufgeführt!
2.000.000,00
BMZ 2004 66 060 Grundbildungsprogramm 18.500.000,00
2005 70 267 Grundbildungsprogramm II – Komponente TTCs
2006 66 552 
BMZ 2004 70 443 Studien- und Fachkräftefonds II 1.653.033,56
BMZ 2007 65 818 EQUIP – Beitrag zum National Basic Education Programme im Rahmen des ARTF 78.000.000,00
2009 65 897
2010 65 317
2011 65 026
2012 65 990
BMZ 2009 67 455 Programm Berufliche Schulen Nordafghanistan 27.000.000,00
BMZ 2001 66 520 Wiederaufbauprogramm Afghanistan 32.562.967,13
Emergency 
Assistance
BMZ 2002 66 486 Winterhilfeprogramm (AFG) 731.773,00
BMZ 2004 65 062 Straßenrehabilitierung Kunduz 3.500.000,00
BMZ 2008 66 160 Finanz. von Maßnahmen des World Food Programms zur Bewältigung der 
Nahrungskrise
16.000.000,00
BMZ 2002 65 652 Stadtnetzrehabilitierung Kabul (Subkomponente Wiederaufbauprogramm) 6.000.000,00
151  This data was generously provided by KfW in an Excel Sheet format, valid as of October 2013.
Lists of all development cooperation projects funded by the Fed-
eral Foreign Office (AA) and the BMZ have been made available 
to DEval for this review. Due to the fact that the data has not 
been authorized by the AA and upon request of the BMZ, the 
following list includes only those projects funded by the BMZ.
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Sector 151 Funding 
Ministry
Project No. Project Name Committed 
funds in Euro
Energy BMZ 2002 65 645 Rehabilitierung Wasserkraftwerk I (Mahipar / Sarobi) 25.500.000,00
BMZ 2005 65 093 Übertragungsleitung Heiratan – Pul-e-Khumri 24.400.000,00
BMZ 2006 70 208 Rehabilitierung Wasserkraftwerke Mahipar und Sarobi – Training O&M  
(BM 2002 65 652)
1.000.000,00
BMZ 2007 65 180 Programm Dezentrale Stromversorgung durch Erneuerbare Energien 49.622.583,76
BMZ 2010 65 283 Netzanbindung nördlicher Städte und Gemeinden in Afghanistan 30.000.000,00
BMZ 2011 65 042 Netzanbindung nördlicher Städte und Gemeinden II 27.000.000,00
BMZ 2011 65 067 Provinzelektrifizierung Nordafghanistan I + II 47.000.000,00
2012 67 343
BMZ 2013 65 030 Regionale Stromübertragung 32.000.000,00
BMZ 2020 50 656 Wiederaufbauprogramm Stromversorgung Kabul 8.883.988,86
Health BMZ 2002 65 108 Offenes Programm Gesundheit (AFG) 2.000.000,00
BMZ 2003 65 791 Gesundheits- und Bildungsprogramm Badghis (Subkomponente Wiederaufbau-
programm) Achtung: auch bei Bildung aufgeführt!
2.000.000,00
Governance BMZ 2004 66 425 Unterstützung von Vorhaben des ARTF 230.000.000,00
2005 65 820
2006 65 463
2007 65 826
2008 65 600
2009 65 913
2010 65 341
2011 65 018
2012 65 982
BMZ 2010 66 562 Regionaler Infrastrukturentwickungsfonds I 47.000.000,00
2011 65 034
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Sector 151 Funding 
Ministry
Project No. Project Name Committed 
funds in Euro
Sustainable 
Economic 
Development
BMZ 2002 65 173 Straßenrehabilitierung Kabul 5.000.000,00
2002 66 726 (+ Aufstockung)
BMZ 2003 65 809 Aufbau einer Mikrofinanzbank Beteiligung (THB + BM + Inv) 12.300.000,00
2004 70 013 First Microfinance Bank (FMFB) ll
2004 65 047
2007 65 834
BMZ 2007 65 602 Ausbau wirtschaftlicher Infrastruktur im Norden – Phase I – IV 44.000.000,00
2007 66 709
2009 66 259
2009 67 356 
BMZ 2010 65 333 Aufbau einer Mirkrofinanzbank II – KMU-Kreditlinie 8.100.000,00
2010 70 218
BMZ 2010 65 291 Nationalstraße Kunduz – Khulm Phase I 22.000.000,00
BMZ 2011 66 958 Nationalstraße Kunduz – Khulm Phase II 20.000.000,00
Water and 
Sanitation
BMZ 2002 65 124 Offenes Programm städtische Wasserversorgung Kabul (AFG) 2.500.000,00
BMZ 2002 65 637 Wasserversorgung Herat (West-Afghanistan) 8.000.000,00
BMZ 2003 66 229 KV-Wasserversorgung Kunduz 4.000.000,00
BMZ 2003 66 583 Wasserversorgung Kabul II 57.500.000,00
2006 65 141 Phase I + II
BMZ 2006 70 083 KV-Wasserversorgung Kabul II (BM) 1.500.000,00
BMZ 2007 66 683 Wasserversorgung Nördliche Klein- und Mittelstädte 36.000.000,00
BMZ 2010 66 570 Städtische Wasserversorgung. in Nord-Afgh 15.000.000,00
2011 66 933 
BMZ 2012 65 651 Wasserversorgung Kabul, Phase III 39.000.000,00
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b) List of GIZ Projects in Afghanistan (BMZ funded)
Sector 152 Project No. Project Name Year Committed funds in Euro
Water 2003.2018.4 Beratung der nationalen Wasserbehörde und nachgelagerter Behörden 2003 1.500.000,00
2004 250.000,00
2004.2105.7 KV – Förderung von Betreiberstrukturen der Trinkwasserver- und Abwasserentsorgung 2004 1.750.000,00
2006 1.500.000,00
2005.2152.6 Reform des Wassersektors 2006 800.000,00
2007.2118.3 Programm zur Verbesserung der Wasserversorgung 2008 6.400.000,00
2009 1.500.000,00
2010.2115.3 Programm zur Verbesserung der Wasserversorgung 2010 300.000,00
2011 5.122.000,00
2012 6.000.000,00
2013 6.250.000,00
Education 2004.2200.6 KV – Programm Förderung der Grundbildung 2005 2.000.000,00
2005.2019.7 Aus- und Fortbildung / Re-Qualifizierung von Frauen 2006 1.000.000,00
2007 -981.000,00
2007.2092.0 Programm Förderung der Grundbildung 2007 5.000.000,00
2009 2.500.000,00
2008.2164.5 Förderung der beruflichen Bildung 2009 2.000.000,00
2009.2189.0 Programm zur Förderung der Grundbildung 2010 4.000.000,00
2011 5.237.000,00
2012 5.500.000,00
2013 5.000.000,00
2010.2113.8 Förderung der beruflichen Bildung 2010 5.000.000,00
2011 5.974.000,00
2012 5.500.000,00
152  This information was generously provided by GIZ in an Excel sheet, and is valid as of November 1, 2013.
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Sector 152 Project No. Project Name Year Committed funds in Euro
Sustainable 
Economic 
Development
2003.2012.7 Programm wirtschaftlicher Wiederaufbau und berufliche Qualifizierung 2003 4.250.000,00
2004 1.750.000,00
2003.2016.8 Aus- und Fortbildung / Re-Qualifizierung von Frauen 2003 2.000.000,00
2004 500.000,00
2004.2167.7 Programm “Wirtschaftlicher Wiederaufbau und berufliche Qualifizierung” 2005 5.000.000,00
2007 -1.142.000,00
2004.2168.5 Förderung kleinerer und mittlerer Unternehmen in Afghanistan 2005 1.500.000,00
2007 -279.000,00
2009 -300.000,00
2004.2219.6 Unterstützung internat. Programme im Bereich der politischen und wirtschaftlichen 
Regierungsförderung
2005 5.000.000,00
2007.2121.7 Programm für nachhaltige Wirtschaftsentwicklung Kabuls 2007 5.500.000,00
2010 250.000,00
2007.2122.5 Programm zur KMU-Förderung und lokalen Wirtschaftsentwicklung im Norden 
Afghanistans
2007 4.000.000,00
2009 1.867.000,00
2010.2210.2 Programm zur Nachhaltigen Wirtschaftsentwicklung im Norden und in Kabul 2010 5.000.000,00
2011 7.000.000,00
2012 8.000.000,00
2013 7.250.000,00
Energy 2003.2017.6 Unterstützung des Stromsektors und Verbreitung erneuerbarer Energien 2003 1.500.000,00
2004.2104.0 Erneuerbare Energien und Energieeffizienz in ländlichen Gebieten 2004 1.750.000,00
2008 -205.000,00
2005.2014.8 Unterstützung des Stromsektors und Verbreitung erneuerbarer Energien 2005 2.000.000,00
2008 -555.000,00
2007.2120.9 Programm Dezentrale Stromversorgung durch Erneuerbare Energien 2008 3.760.000,00
2009 3.500.000,00
2009.2190.8 Programm Dezentrale Stromversorgung durch Erneuerbare Energien 2010 4.000.000,00
2011 4.500.000,00
2012 4.800.000,00
2013 4.100.000,00
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Sector 152 Project No. Project Name Year Committed funds in Euro
Governance 2002.2080.6 Wiederaufbau Afghanistan / Maßnahmen im Bereich Demokratieförderung 2002 4.750.000,00
2004 511.000,00
2003.2015.0 Rechtsberatung und Herstellung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit 2003 1.500.000,00
2004 500.000,00
2005.2187.2 Förderung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit 2006 1.500.000,00
2007 2.000.000,00
2009 1.000.000,00
2006.2101.1 Regionale Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungsförderung Nordost 2006 2.000.000,00
2007 -1.221.000,00
2006.2102.9 Exportförderung und WTO-Beitritt 2006 1.800.000,00
2007 -877.000,00
2009 -267.000,00
2010 1.500.000,00
2007.2119.1 Gender Mainstreaming 2007 1.500.000,00
2008 1.000.000,00
2009 1.000.000,00
2009.2002.5 Förderung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit 2009 2.500.000,00
2010 7.000.000,00
2012 3.000.000,00
2009.2208.8 Politikberatungsfonds 2009 600.000,00
2010 2.000.000,00
2011 2.000.000,00
2009.2003.3 Gender Mainstreaming 2010 2.000.000,00
2011 1.000.000,00
2012 500.000,00
10.2191.4 Regionaler Strukturentwicklungsfonds Nordafghanistan 2010 24.000.000,00
2011 184.000,00
2012 13.300.000,00
2013 8.700.000,00
2010.2114.6 Offener Politikberatungsfonds 2012 2.000.000,00
2013 500.000,00
2012.2053.2 Förderung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit 2012 5.500.000,00
2013 4.600.000,00
2012.2254.6 Förderung Guter Regierungsführung im Rohstoffsektor 2013 4.000.000,00
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Sector 152 Project No. Project Name Year Committed funds in Euro
Peace-Building 2006.1822.3 Überregionaler Kleinprojektefonds Afghanistan 2006 330.000,00
Agriculture 2010.2112.0 Sicherung der Ernährung in der Provinz Baghlan 2010 2.000.000,00
2011 2.000.000,00
2012 2.000.000,00
2013 1.500.000,00
Others 1995.3522.0 Studien- und Fachkräftefonds 2003 500.000,00
2004 500.000,00
2005 500.000,00
2009 1.200.000,00
2010 2.000.000,00
2004.2103.2 Gender Mainstreaming 2004 1.738.000,00
2007.1806.4 Wiederaufbau Südostafghanistan 2007 1.000.000,00
2007.2196.9 Aufbau von Basisinfrastruktur und Schaffung von Einkommen in ländlichen Regionen 2008 10.000.000,00
2009 12.000.000,00
2010 13.500.000,00
2011 12.000.000,00
2008.2097.7 Sicherheitssystem für GTZ, DED, InWent und KfW 2008 2.300.000,00
2009 1.500.000,00
2010 2.000.000,00
2008.2146.2 Aufbau von Basisinfrastruktur und Schaffung von Einkommen in ländlichen Regionen 
Süd-Ost Afghanistans
2009 3.000.000,00
2009.2001.7 EZ-Sicherheitssystem 2010 7.000.000,00
2011 8.000.000,00
2012 8.700.000,00
2013 9.000.000,00
2011.2170.6 Strategische Entwicklung der afg.-dt. EZ 2011 2.000.000,00
2011.3501.1 Studien- und Fachkräftefonds 2011 2.228.000,00
2012 1.900.000,00
2013 1.000.000,00
2012.2011.0 EH Naher Osten / Afghanistan 2012 231.000,00
2012.2253.8 Stärkung von ländlichen Livelihood Systemen 2012 7.000.000,00
2013 8.000.000,00
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AA
Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Foreign 
Office)
AIMS
Afghanistan Information Manage-
ment Services
AISA
Afghanistan Investment Support 
Agency
ANDS
Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy
ANP
Afghan National Police 
ARTF
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust 
Fund
AusAID
Australian Agency for International 
Development
BMI
Bundesministerium des Innern 
(Federal Ministry of the Intertior)
BMVg
Bundesministerium der Verteidi-
gung (Federal Ministry of Defense)
BMEL 
Bundesministerium für Ernährung 
und Landwirtschaft (Federal 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture)
BMZ
Bundesministerium für wirtschaft-
liche Zusammenarbeit und Entwick-
lung (Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development)
BMZ-E
Evaluation of Development 
Cooperation Division of the BMZ
CD
Capacity Development
CIM
Centrum für Internationale 
Migration und Entwicklung (Center 
for International Migration and 
Development)
DANIDA
Danish International Development 
Agency
DED
Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst 
(German Development Service)
DEG
Deutsche Investitions- und 
Entwicklungsgesellschaft
DFG
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
(German Research Foundation)
DfID
UK Department for International 
Development
ENÜH
Entwicklungsorientierte Not- und 
Übergangshilfe (Development-Ori-
ented Emergency and Transition 
Aid)
EQUIP
Education Quality Improvement 
Program
ESÜH
Entwicklungsfördernde und 
strukturbildende Übergangshilfe 
(Development-Supporting and 
Structure-Forming Transition Aid)
FMFB
First Microfinance Bank 
FZ-E
Evaluierungsabteilung für 
Finanzielle Zusammenarbeit, KfW 
(Financial Cooperation Evaluation 
Unit, KfW)
GDC
German Development Cooperation 
(confined to BMZ portfolio)
GIGA
German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies (Leibnitz-Institut für 
Globale und Regionale Studien)
GIRoA
Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan
GIZ
Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(German Agency for International 
Cooperation) 
GTZ 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Tech-
nische Zusammenarbeit (German 
Agency for Technical Cooperation)
HMEP
Helmand Monitoring and Evalua-
tion Program (UK)
IATI
International Aid Transparency 
Initiative
ICAI
Independent Commission for Aid 
Impact (UK)
IED
Independent Evaluation Depart-
ment (Asia Development Bank)
IEG
Independent Evaluation Group 
(World Bank)
InWent
Internationale Weiterbildung und 
Entwicklung gGmbH (Capacity 
Building International)
ISAF
International Security Assistance 
Forces
KfW
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(German Development Bank)
MoE
Ministry of Education, Afghanistan
MDTF
Multi Donor Trust Fund
M&E
Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO
Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD
Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation 
NSP
National Solidarity Program
OECD
Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development
OECD / DAC
OECD Development Assistance 
Committee
OPAF
Open Policy Advisory Fund
PCA
Peace and Conflict Analysis (e.g. 
PCA Unit in RMO)
PPR
Project Progress Review (or PFK 
– Projektfortschrittskontrolle) 
RBM
Results-Based Monitoring
RCDF
Regional Capacity Development 
Fund
RIDF
Regional Infrastructure Develop-
ment Fund 
RMO
Risk Management Office
SFB 700
Sonderforschungsbereich 700 der 
Freien Universität Berlin (Collabora-
tive Research Center)
SPNA
Stabilization Program Northern 
Afghanistan
TMAF
Tokyo Mutual Accountability Fund
UK
United Kingdom
UNDG
United Nations Development Group
USD
United States of America Dollar
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